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Abstract
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze mechanisms that implement a social
objective for two environments in which agents have incomplete information
about the others’ characteristics. Agents’ beliefs about the characteristics of
any particular agent are common knowledge. We consider the case where mon-
etary transfers or costly signals are undesirable or unavailable. Chapter 1 gives
an overview of the contents of the thesis. Chapter 2 studies mechanisms for
resolution of bilateral conflict over a prize of common value. This conflict
may be settled by a peaceful agreement or may lead to a socially inefficient
outcome of war. We model explicitly the cost of war as dependent upon op-
ponents’ types which are private information. The social choice function is the
probability of peaceful resolution. We assess the chances for peace in the case
of no communication and a simultaneous choice by agents whether to agree
to a given split proposal. We compare these chances with the probability of
peaceful settlement achieved by a mechanism which solicits partial disclosure
of private information. We require the truthful revelation of this information to
be a dominant strategy for agents in the game induced by the mechanism. In
this framework we show that unmediated communication always improves the
probability of peace upon the agreement game. In chapter 3 we study a cardi-
nal mechanism for allocation of heterogeneous indivisible goods among agents
with private valuations. We assume that agents and the mechanism designer
hold the same beliefs about the ex ante distribution of the multidimensional
types. We relax the dominant strategy requirement for the truthful revelation to
the requirement of Bayesian incentive compatibility. We provide a necessary
condition for Bayesian incentive compatibility of such mechanisms for any fi-
nite number of goods and agents. We characterize the set of Bayesian incentive
compatible mechanisms for the case of three objects and three agents and we
analyze efficiency and fairness properties of these mechanisms. In particular,
we show that in this framework an ex post efficient and envy-free mechanism
may not exist for some systems of beliefs.

Chapter 1
Introduction
Much decentralized decision making involves inference under uncertainty in
environments in which agents have preferences over social choices and incom-
plete information about the preference profile and other agents’ information.
Implementation theory describes in a formal way the interaction between indi-
viduals under the specific rules of an institution or a mechanism. The notion of
full implementation requires the exact coincidence of the set of outcomes, pre-
scribed by given solution concept, with the social choice set. A social choice
set is partially implemented by the mechanism as long as there exists one equi-
librium outcome of the induced game that is socially optimal. In both theoret-
ical and applied works a partial implementation is widely used under different
choice of solution concepts (see e.g. [18] by Maskin (2002)).
Palfrey (1993) describes in [24] the Bayesian implementation as a branch
of implementation theory where "... individual preferences and information are
modelled explicitly, beliefs are updated according to Bayes’ rule, outcomes are
evaluated according expected utility theory..." and all agents choose actions that
maximize expected utility, given strategies of the other agents. Following the
work [20] of Myerson (1985), agents’ private information is summarized by the
notion of a type, where each agent knows his own type but may be unsure about
the types of other agents. Beliefs of agents are encoded by probability distri-
butions of type profiles. Equilibrium concept for the game with incomplete in-
formation induced by the mechanism is Harsanyi’s (1967:1968) Bayesian equi-
librium. A social choice function is Bayesian incentive compatible if and only
if truthful revelation of private information can arise as a Bayesian equilibrium
of some mechanism (see [25] by Palfrey (2002)). A social function is Bayesian
implementable if it is Bayesian incentive compatible with respect to all beliefs
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of all agents. A revelation mechanism may have undesirable equilibria in addi-
tion to the truthful one.
We characterize Bayesian mechanisms that implement social choice sets for
two different environments with private values and independent types, in order
to explain aspects of mechanism selection.
In the first environment we evaluate from the ex ante perspective, i.e., be-
fore the parties know their types, alternative mechanisms aiming to resolve a
conflict. These mechanisms partially implement the social choice in a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium of the induced game.
Application of mechanism design to resolution of conflicts was pioneered
by Banks (1990), Fearon (1995), Warneryd (2003), Bester andWarneryd (2006),
and Fey and Ramsay (2009). These authors study the design of political and
economic institutions to prevent or resolve any type of destructive conflict. A
number of processes can be used to resolve a conflict, dispute or a claim. Dis-
pute resolution processes are alternatives to having a war resolve the conflict
or handling the dispute in the court system. These processes can be used to
resolve conflicts in such areas as interstate relations, family matters, or work-
place and contracting practices. Dispute resolution processes are cheaper and
usually generate a solution faster than war resolution or litigation. The most
common forms of dispute resolution processes are negotiation, mediation, and
arbitration. The research on conflict resolution processes focus on conditions
under which negotiation or mediation are chosen and the general effectiveness
of these processes.
A part of negotiation is bargaining which has been modelled and extensively
studied in the economic literature in both cooperative and non-cooperative se-
tups (extensive surveys are provided e.g. by Muthoo (1999) and by Napel
(2002)). The equilibrium settlement is well understood in bargaining situa-
tions where parties’ disagreement payoffs are common knowledge. In his sem-
inal work on axiomatic bargaining theory, Nash (1950) provides a solution of
the two-person bargaining problem where the disagreement payoffs are known
to both players. The literature on bilateral bargaining in the environment with
two-sided uncertainty about outside options is scarce (see e.g. [26] by Sanchez-
Pages (2012)). An usual assumption in this literature is that a negotiator faces
more than one candidate to reach an agreement with and an outside option for
the negotiator become these alternative opponents and prizes. This is an appro-
priate model in the context of bilateral trade but certainly not a realistic model
for all dispute resolution processes. The study of bargaining with incomplete
3information can be conducted in the framework of Bayesian mechanism design
rather than modelled by a sequence of offers and counteroffers. The mechanism
design provides a tool for characterization of the set of attainable outcomes for
any particular environment and determines the optimal method for conflict res-
olution from the point of view of the designer.
Goltsman, Horner, Pavlov and Squintani (2009) study in [14] all three dif-
ferent classes of communication procedures: arbitration, mediation and nego-
tiation, in the context of the Crawford and Sobel (1982) model of cheap talk
with two players, the informed party and the decision-maker. In this setting,
authors find that "mediation performs better than negotiation when the conflict
of interest is intermediate, whereas a mediator is unnecessary and two rounds
of communication suffice when the conflict of interest is low". These findings
about the potential and the limitations of mediation and negotiations are con-
firmed by some empirical studies of international negotiations and mediations
(see e.g. [5] by Bercovitch and Jackson (2001)). Goltsman et al. pose the
question about the relative efficiency of negotiations and mediation beyond the
classical framework of Crawford and Sobel’s model.
In chapter 2 we study the efficiency of alternative forms of resolving dis-
putes between two parties that are uncertain about the cost of war and win prob-
ability. We measure efficiency of peace promoting mechanisms by the ex ante
probability of peaceful agreement. The designer’s choice in this environment is
a settlement that maximises of the ex ante probability of peace. In our model
of bilateral conflict the uncertainty about the cost of war and win probability
is two-sided, and the cost of war is endogenously determined by the types of
opponents. We consider continuous types representing the war capability of
contestants. We estimate the probability of peace for an agreement game with-
out communication and for unmediated communication with partial revelation
of private information. We show that a peace talk game improves upon the
game without communication for all parameters of the model. We study peace
benefits over direct communication that a strategic mediator may achieve. We
show that some mediation programs with partial revelation of private informa-
tion do not improve upon unmediated communication with the same message
space. We find that these mediation programmes do not introduce sufficient
noise into the communication between parties and fail to prevent "leakages" of
information to the opponents.
Chapter 2 is organized as follows. In the first section we present a model
of conflict in which the loss of welfare in the case of war is proportional to
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the types of opponents. In section 2 we estimate the probability of peace in
the case of lack of communication between players and exogenous split pro-
posal. Section 3 studies the probability of peace in the case of unmediated
communication. Section 4 studies the probability of peace for a class of medi-
ation programs with partial revelation of private information. The final section
discusses some limitations of our approach and relations to the literature on
conflict resolution.
The goal of the mechanisms we consider in chapter 3 is to allocate heteroge-
neous indivisible goods to agents with private values and common prior belief
about preferences of others.
The first version of the problem of allocation of indivisible goods to self-
interested agents with privately known preferences is introduced by Hylland
and Zeckhauser (1979). In the paper "The Efficient Allocation of Individuals
to Positions" Hylland and Zeckhauser propose a procedure for allocation of
individuals to positions with capacity constraints. The preferences of individ-
uals are unknown and there are no monetary compensations in this model. It
is assumed that each individual truthfully reports to the mechanism the utility
level that he receives from each position. Lotteries of probability shares are as-
signed to individuals using a pseudomarket for these shares. Individual’s bud-
get constraint is given by the condition that the sum of his probability shares
must equal one. The expected assignment of lotteries is ex ante efficient and
envy-free. However, this procedure is not incentive compatible. It presumes
that individuals can not affect the competitive equilibrium price of probability
shares. Next papers on probabilistic mechanisms adopt an ordinal approach and
elicit agents’ ordinal preferences.
The standard operator used to extend preference relations over objects to
preferences over lotteries is the first order stochastic dominance (sd) introduced
in this context by Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) in [7]. The content of def-
inition of properties of assignment rules like efficiency, no-envy and strategy
proofness are affected by this choice of lottery dominance criterion. Two main
probabilistic assignment rules have been considered in the literature. The Ran-
dom Serial Dictatorship mechanism is strategyproof and anonymous, but only
ex-post efficient. It is widely used in applications and studied among others in
[1] and [2] by Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez (1998: 1999). However, Bogomol-
naia and Moulin provide in [7] an example where the random serial dictatorship
assignment is first order stochastically dominated for all agents by another ran-
dom assignment. An expected assignment is ordinally efficient or "sd efficient"
5if no other assignment stochastically dominates the given one for all agents. An
expected assignment is "sd envy-free" if according to each agent’s preferences
his assignment sd dominates the assignment of any other agent. More demand-
ing ordinal efficiency is achieved by the Probabilistic Serial mechanism (PS)
introduced by Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001). It is the only ordinal mecha-
nism which is sd efficient and sd envy free. Efficiency gain of the PS mecha-
nism comes with incentives for agents to misrepresent their ordinal preferences.
Sd strategy-proofness of an ordinal rule is the property that a truthful report of
preferences guarantees at least as desirable lottery in the stochastic dominance
sense as any lottery received by misreporting. Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001)
show that the probabilistic serial mechanism is not sd strategy-proof. Objec-
tives that are achieved by the assignment rule with respect to potentially false
preferences are irrelevant to the properties, as sd efficiency and sd no-envy,
with respect to the true preferences. This impedes the implementation of the
probabilistic serial rule in applications.
Katta and Sethuraman (2006) introduce an extension to the original PS
mechanism by allowing agents to be indifferent between objects. The authors
show in [8] that when agents are allowed to report indifference it is impossi-
ble for even a weak strategy-proof mechanism to find an expected assignment
that is both ordinally efficient and envy-free. The concerns for the incentive
properties of the PS mechanism may be severe for implementation in small as-
signment problems. Kojima and Manea show in [17] that truthful reporting of
ordinal preferences is a weakly dominant strategy in problems where there are
sufficiently many copies of each object.
The question of existence of efficient Bayesian incentive compatible mech-
anisms in the environment with private valuations and quasi-linear utility has
attracted a lot of attention in the literature. In the case where monetary trans-
fers or costly signals are possible, the literature provides characterisation of
interim efficient and Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms. Mechanisms
with these properties have been characterised in the context of bilateral trade,
auctions, and public good problems. Ohseto (2006) characterises in [23] the
set of strategy-proof and envy-free mechanisms of allocating indivisible goods
when monetary compensations are possible.
One direction of research on the optimal allocation mechanisms without
monetary compensations is represented in [8] by Chakravarty and Kaplan (2013)
and in the recent paper [4] by Ben-Porath, Dekel, and Lipman (2013). Chakravarty
and Kaplan allow the designer to receive costly and socially wasteful signals
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from agents. Authors find conditions where allocating the goods randomly is
optimal and study cases where mechanisms as a contest or a contest with a bid
cap are superior. Ben-Porath, Dekel, and Lipman assume that the mechanism
designer can verify the type of agents at a cost and characterise the class of op-
timal Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms, showing that the mechanism
with favoured agent is optimal.
In comparison, there are a handful of papers on allocation mechanisms in
environments without monetary transfers or costly signals. Tayfun Sonmez and
M. Utku Unver (2010) consider in [14] a mechanism in which each agent max-
imises his expected utility given a system of beliefs. These beliefs are given
through a joint probability distribution function denoting the probability that
the lowest bid required to receive an object (the market-clearing price) will be
less than or equal to p. Similar to the Hylland and Zeckhauser’s procedure
in [15], it is assumed that agents are price takers given this system of beliefs.
Miralles (2012) studies in [19] Bayesian incentive compatible cardinal mech-
anisms for efficient allocation of two ex ante identical objects between two
symmetric agents with independent private valuations. The author assumes that
each valuation vector is drawn from the same distribution function and does not
constrain the number of objects allocated per agent. It is shown that the mecha-
nism which maximises the unweighted sum of agents’ ex ante expected payoffs
is a combination of lotteries, auctions and insurance.
We consider the allocation problem in the environment where monetary
compensations or costly signals are undesirable or unavailable. Examples of
these class of problems are the assignment of offices among employees and
children’s placement in public schools. We assume that agents and the mech-
anism designer share a common belief about the ex ante distribution of prefer-
ences which are private information. We study allocation mechanisms that treat
both agents and objects symmetrically. No pre-existing ordering is assumed
neither for the set of agents nor for the set of objects. A variety of formal cri-
teria of economic justice have been studied in the social choice literature (see
[15] by Thompson (2007) for an overview). The "no envy" criterion is pro-
posed by Foley (1967) in [12]. An allocation is envy free if each agent likes
his own assignment at least as much as the assignment of any other agent. We
consider the existence of a mechanism that allows the social designer to obtain
an envy free allocation of objects and simultaneously achieves the social goal
of efficiency. In this environment we characterize the set of Bayesian incentive
compatible assignment mechanisms.
7Chapter 3 is organized as follows. In section 1 we explain the motivation
for the study of allocation problem in the environment where monetary com-
pensations are not available and agents hold beliefs about the distribution of
preferences. In section 2 we describe an assignment mechanism that elicits car-
dinal information about agents’ preferences and assigns a probability distribu-
tion over the set of feasible allocations for each preference profile. In section 2
we provide necessary conditions for incentive compatibility of the mechanisms
for any finite number of agents. In section 3 we characterize the set of incentive
compatible mechanisms for the case of three agents. In section 4 we provide
some necessary conditions for regularity of the optimization problem related to
the interim efficient mechanisms. In section 5 we provide examples of the set
of ex post efficient and envy-free assignments for the mechanism. In the last
section we show that the ex post envy-freeness property may be incompatible
with ex post incentive efficiency of the mechanism. We provide an example of
common belief where the set of ex post incentive efficient and ex post envy-free
assignments for the mechanism is empty.
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Chapter 2
Peace talks with interdependent
cost of conflict
The class of models that is central to current thinking about an international
dispute between states is games with two-sided incomplete information. At any
stage of negotiations each party can withdraw unilaterally and take up its war
payoff. The theoretical literature on international conflict reveals the role of pri-
vate beliefs of involved parties about the war payoff structure in the shaping of
any settlement available through some peaceful process. The literature points
out (see [8] by Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2007)) that the outcome of a military
conflict between two parties is subject to much uncertainty. The general as-
sumption is that the only source of vacillation are the probabilities of winning a
war for each player, while in practice there are multiple sources of uncertainty.
One of them is the value of the prize for the prospective winner. The possibility
of peaceful resolution of conflict in the case of independent valuations and un-
certainty about the opponent’s fixed cost of war is studied by Fey and Ramsey
(2011) in [5].
In this paper we incorporate this source of cost uncertainty in a situation
with interdependent valuations. We model explicitly the cost of a conflict as
proportional to the fighting capacities of opponents. These capacities are part
of the private information that directly affects payoffs of both disputants in the
case of conflict.
Therefore, the outcome of the bilateral bargaining in our model is deter-
mined by an outside option for which parties do not have complete information.
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We study the Bayesian-Nash equilibria in the crisis bargaining game for three
types of settlement procedures: a split proposal game, an unmediated commu-
nication between parties, and strategic mediation by a third party.
2.1 The model
2.1.1 Structure of private information
Two players contest a prize of common value one. The dispute may lead to a
war or litigation. Only a peaceful settlement is ex post efficient. The winner of
the outright conflict takes a prize of value less than one. Players value ex post
the war prize identically. The probability of winning the war prize is deter-
mined by the relative strength of players. For the sake of simplicity, we assume
that players are ex ante symmetric. The strength ti of player i in a potential
military conflict is a realisation of a random variable in T and is referred to as
type of player i. Each player privately observes his own type. The information
of a player about the type of his opponent is summarized by the cumulative
probability distribution function F(t) on T . Function F(t) is common knowl-
edge. It is assumed that the realisation of one player’ s type does not affect the
likelihood of the other player’ s types. Formally, the joint distribution function
satisfies F(ti, t j) = F(ti)F(t j) for any (ti, t j) ∈ T ×T where F(ti) and F(t j) are
marginal distribution functions. We assume thereafter that types of both play-
ers are independently and identically drawn from the interval T = [0,1] with
uniform probability distribution. A uniform distribution of types is consistent
with the assumption of lack of knowledge about opponent’s type. We assume
that the probability distribution of types after restricting the support is again
uniform.
2.1.2 The outside option
At the interim stage an alternative of a peaceful agreement is only unilateral or
bilateral initiation of an outright confrontation. The outcome of the confronta-
tion is interpreted as probability of winning the whole prize and not as a split
of the prize as in Rubinstein’s alternating-offer bargaining game. We denote
player i￿s probability of winning the prize by p(ti, t j) and player j￿s probability
of winning by 1− p(ti, t j). We consider the probability that contestant i gets the
prize after his effort level has been exerted and the fighting capability ti has been
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obtained. The fighting capability of contestant is a noisy predictor of the out-
come of the war or, in a legal context, the litigation. The decision whom to give
the prize is determined both by the relative strength of players and by the fair-
ness related type of the decision-making institution or process. The prize lottery
faced by each contestant is given by probability measure p(ti, t j) on T ×T :
p(ti, t j) =

p for t1 > t2
1
2 for t1 = t2,
1− p for t1 < t2
where p> 1− p, that is, p> 12 . Parameter p is interpreted as a degree to which
the relative strength of players is a noisy predictor of the award decision. In a
legal context, p is interpreted as a degree to which property rights are defined
by the relative strength of arguments (see [2] by Bester and Warneryd (2006)).
It is assumed that p< 1, that is, property rights are not perfectly defined.
We assume that any possible peaceful settlement is efficient. In order to
limit the range of potential settlements that are acceptable by the opponents we
assume that they are both risk averse. In the model with win probability p(ti, t j),
where ti > t j and p is the payoff of player i, a peaceful split (p,1− p) would
always be accepted if the relative strength of players was a common knowledge.
However, each player has a constant, non decreasing in his type, incentive to
misrepresent this type. According to Fey and Ramsay (2009) (see [7]), the
combination of uncertainty about the other player’s strength in war and the
incentive to misrepresent private information has been identified in the literature
as a central cause of war. Fearon (1995) points out in [4] that the bargaining
might not prevent a war if the prize at stake is indivisible. The indivisible
probability p(ti, t j) of getting the prize can be considered as an additional war
favouring condition to the indivisible prize.
2.1.3 War payoffs
Both players can take an unilateral action and induce war. Player’s payoff from
this activity is not known ex ante. The uncertainty about this option is twofold.
Apart from the uncertainty about the probability of winning the prize, players
are uncertain about the cost of conflict. A conflict shrinks the value of the prize.
The standard assumption in the literature is that a conflict destroys a fixed part of
the initial value (see [2] by Bester and Warneryd (2006) and [14] by Warneryd
(2010)). This corresponds to the assumption that the war budget is fixed while
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in practice it is difficult to translate into financial terms and changes with the
opportunity cost of doing something else. Hence, it is reasonable to assume
that the loss, due to the overall resources expended, is a function of strengths of
players involved in the conflict.
In both military and legal context, it is more costly to pick the winner when
players differ less in their strength. Hence, the lower is the difference, the more
destructive is conflict. Additionally, the value of the prize θ(ti, t j) allocated to
the winner is decreasing in both players’ strength. We assume that the value of
the prize θ(ti, t j) allocated to the winner satisfies conditions
θ(ti, t j)> θ(t ￿i , t j) i f t ￿i > ti, and θ(ti, t j)> θ(ti, t ￿j) i f t ￿j > t j.
It is easy to check that when the value of the prize depends solely on the dif-
ference ti− t j in fighting capacities of opponents then for any feasible values
of parameters the expected war payoff is sufficiently low for the peaceful split
(1/2,1/2) to be unanimously accepted. That is why we make a more sound
assumption that the destruction technology is given by some function
θ(ti, t j) = 1−αti t j, (2.1)
where 0<α < 1. This choice of technology reflects the observation that for any
given distribution of fighting resources t1 and t2 a war between players of equal
strength is the most destructive. This is the case because for any fixed total
resource S = t1+ t2, the constrained maximum max{t1+t2=S}{t1 t2} is achieved
when t1 = t2. Besides, a war between stronger opponents shrinks more the prize
value given by (2.1).
2.2 Peaceful settlement without communication
In this paragraph we calculate the ex ante probability of peaceful settlement in
the Bayesian-Nash equilibria of a split proposal game. This mechanism does
not solicit any private information and assumes that players do not communi-
cate. The set of feasible outcomes in the split proposal game represents values
of the prize allocated to players.
Definition 1 The set of feasible outcomes is Y = {(y1,y2) : y1+ y2 ≤ 1}. The
set Y e for which y1+ y2 = 1 is called the set of efficient outcomes.
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Players are proposed a split (x,1− x) ∈ Ye. At the time of proposal there is no
common or private knowledge about the relative strength of players. After ob-
serving their own type, players simultaneously choose whether to agree or not
to the given split proposal. If both players accept the split then war is prevented,
otherwise they fight. We assume that no other peace promoting mechanism is
available.
A pure strategy σi(x, t) of player i in the split proposal game specifies one of
the two responses, ’accept’ or ’reject’, for each split proposal and each potential
type. Before responding to the proposal, each player estimates the conditional
probability distribution of his war payoff using the prior probability distribu-
tion F . Beliefs of players about war payoffs are formed on the base of both
parameters p and α , under the lack of knowledge about the relative strength.
The probability that proposal (p,1− p) or (1− p, p)will be jointly accepted
is zero, although with probability 1/2 the value p > 1/2 is proposed to the
higher type. As we show in subsequent paragraphs, the reason is that 1− p is
the minimal expected war payoff. Hence, there are no values of p and α for
which proposal (p,1− p) or (1− p, p) leads to voluntary peaceful settlement
with positive probability.
Denote by π(t) the expected war payoff for any player of type t.
Definition 2 The assessment (x,σ1(x, t1),σ2(x, t2),π(t1),π(t2)) is a pure strat-
egy Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the split proposal game if
(i) given the split x, for each player i of type t, the response σi(x, t) max-
imises the expected value of the allocated prize, given his belief π(ti),
(ii) for each x, each player’s belief π(ti) satisfies Bayes’ rule, that is,
π(ti) =
￿ 1
0
p(ti, t j)θ(ti, t j)dF(t j).
Denote byP(x,1−x) the probability of peace with peaceful split (x,1−x).
Proposition 1 The probability of peace P(1/2,1/2) in the Bayesian Nash
equilibrium of the split proposal game without communication is 1 for p(1−
α)< 1/2.
Proof: Consider beliefs of players regarding their relative strength. The split
(12 ,
1
2) will be accepted by a player who beliefs the opponent to be of the same
type because α > 0 and 12 ≥ 12(1−αt2) for any t ∈ T . Let player i beliefs
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to be of the higher type. The war payoff of the higher type is π(ti) = p(1−
αtit j)< p(1−αt2i )< p(1−α). Therefore, if p(1−α)< 12 , then a peaceful split
(12 ,
1
2) will be accepted by the player who beliefs to be of the higher type. Let
player i beliefs to be of lower type. The war payoff of the lower type is π(ti) =
(1− p)(1−αtit j)< (1− p)(1−αt2j )< p(1−αt2j )< p(1−α) because p> 12 .
Therefore, if p(1−α)< 12 , then a peaceful split (12 , 12) will be accepted by both
players, irrelevant of their beliefs about the type of the opponent. Hence, peace
can be attained with probability 1 when p(1−α)< 12 . ￿
Hereafter we shall assume that
p(1−α)> 1
2
. (2.2)
In subsequent paragraphs we assess the ex ante probability of peace in the
Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the peace proposal game for every given split
x. We shall determine the split which maximizes this chance.
We will be using the following lemma.
Lemma 1 Expected war payoff π(t) of type t is strictly increasing in t for pa-
rameters satisfying condition (2.2).
Proof: Conditional probability of being the higher type for player i of type ti is
ti because P{t j < ti}= ti. The expectation of truncated type t j is
E{t j|a< t j ≤ b}=
￿ b
a
t j
b−a dt j.
The payoff expectation for player 1 in case of war, when his type is known to
be t1, is given by
π(t1) =
￿ 1
0
p(t1, t2)θ(t1, t2)dF(t2) = (2.3)
=
￿ t1
0
p(1−αt1t2)dF(t2)+
￿ 1
t1
(1− p)(1−αt1t2)dF(t2) =
= 1− p+(−1− α
2
+2p+
α p
2
)t1+(
α
2
−α p)t31 . (2.4)
We show in the next paragraph that expression (2.4) is strictly increasing in t1
for t1 ∈ (0,1) and any pair of parameters α and p that satisfies condition (2.2).
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We notice that stationary points of π(t1) satisfy condition
∂π(t1)
∂ t1
=−2−α+4p+α p+3αt2−6α pt2 = 0. (2.5)
The coefficient in front of the cube of t1 in expression (2.4) is negative because
α
2 −α p = α(1/2− p) and p > 1/2. Hence, π(t) is a concave function. More-
over, π(t1) tends to −∞ when t1 tends to ∞ and vice versa. Then the negative
stationary point −
￿
4p+α p−α−2
6α p−3α of π(t1) corresponds to a local minimum and
the positive stationary point
￿
4p+α p−α−2
6α p−3α of π(t1) corresponds to a local max-
imum. Hence, it is sufficient to show that the positive stationary point is higher
than 1. We notice that
4p+ap−a−2
6ap−3a > 1⇔ a<
4p−2
5p−2 ⇔ a<
2p−1
5
2 p−1
.
By (2.2) inequality a< 2p−12p holds. Additionally,
2p−1
2p
<
2p−1
5
2 p−1
because 52 p−1< 2p for any p< 1. Hence,
α < 2p−1
5/2p−1 .
Therefore,
4p+α p−α−2
6α p−3α > 1
for any parameters α and p satisfying condition (2.2). ￿
Notice that the minimal expected payoff of a player is π(0) = 1− p< 12 and
the maximal expected payoff is
π(1) = p(1− α
2
)>
1
2
.
In order to convince the player of type ti to accept a payoff x we set
x≥ π(ti).
We denote byP(x,1−x) the probability of peace with peaceful split (x,1−x).
This probability is determined by the joint cumulative distribution function of
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random variables π(t1) and π(t2). These random variables are independent
because t1 and t2 are independent. Hence, the joint cumulative distribution is a
product of marginal distributions. Therefore,
P(x,1− x) = P(x≥ π(ti)∧1− x≥ π(t j)) = P(x≥ π(ti))P(1− x≥ π(t j)).
The following claim is proved in the Appendix.
Proposition 2 The probability of peace with equal split is
P(1/2,1/2) =−4
3
r sin2 (
π
6
− 1
3
arccos(
3
√
3q
￿
−1r
2r
))
where r and q are given by
r =
−2−α+4p+α p
α(1−2p) and q=
1
α
. (2.6)
This result shows that the probability of peace with equal split is lower that
1/2 for some parameter values. For example, if (p,α) = (3/4,1/4) then the
probability of peace with equal split isP ≈ 0.310, if (p,α) = (5/6,1/8) then
P ≈ 0.267, if (p,α) = (3/4,1/6) thenP ≈ 0.286.
The expected war payoff π(t) is nonlinear in t and it seems difficult to cal-
culate its cumulative distribution function. However, by Lemma (1) function
π(t) is monotonically increasing for t ∈ [0,1]. Hence, a linear approximation
of π(t) over the interval [0,1] is appropriate and has the advantage of being
uniformly distributed. We would like to find an upper bound for the probability
P(x,1−x). By using a linear approximation which provides a lower bound for
π(t), we prove the following result.
Proposition 3 The probability of peaceP(x,1−x) in the Bayesian Nash equi-
librium of the split proposal game without communication satisfies inequality
P(x,1− x)≤ (2p−1)
2
(4p−2−α p)2 f or p(1−α)> 1/2.
Proof: Function π(t) is concave for t ∈ [0,1] (see proof of Lemma (1)). Hence,
the linear function f (t)=At+Bwhich satisfies conditions f (1)= π(1)= p(1−
α
2 ) and f (0) = π(0) = 1− p provides a lower bound for π(t). Then B= 1− p
and A= p(1− α2 )− (1− p) = 2p−1− α p2 .
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Hence,
f (t) = At+B= (2p−1− α p
2
)t+1− p.
The distribution of f (t) is defined by the cumulative distribution function
Ff (x) = P( f (t)≤ x) = P
￿
t ≤ x−B
A
￿
= (2.7)
= P
￿
t ≤ x− (1− p)
2p−1− α p2
￿
= Ft
￿
x− (1− p)
2p−1− α p2
￿
.
For example, an upper bound for the probability that a payoff of 1/2 will be
accepted in the equilibrium is given by inequality
P(1/2≥ π(t))≤ P(1/2≥ f (t))
where
P( f (t)≤ 1/2) = P
￿
t ≤
1
2 − (1− p)
2p−1− α p2
￿
= Ft
￿
p−1/2
2p−1− α p2
￿
=
2p−1
4p−2−α p .
Then the upper bound for the probability of peace with equal split is
P(1/2,1/2)≤
￿
2p−1
4p−2−α p
￿2
= Pˆ(1/2,1/2).
The accuracy of this estimation is exemplified by the upper bounds Pˆ for
(p,α) = (3/4,1/4), (p,α) = (5/6,1/8), and (p,α) = (3/4,1/6) which are
approximately 0.379, 0.294, and 0.327.
Further, we can find the upper bound for the probability of peace with split
(y,1−y) for any y∈ [0,1]. By substituting x= 1−y and x= y in (2.7) we obtain
Ff (1− y) = Ft
￿
(1− y)− (1− p)
2p−1− α p2
￿
= Ft
￿
p− y
2p−1− α p2
￿
=
p− y
2p−1− α p2
and
Ff (y) = Ft
￿
y− (1− p)
2p−1− α p2
￿
=
y−1+ p
2p−1− α p2
.
Then
P(y,1− y)≤ (y−1+ p)(p− y)
(2p−1− α p2 )2
= G(y).
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FunctionG(y) has a local maximum at y= 1/2 becauseG￿(y) = 1−2y
(2p−1−α p2 )2
and
G￿￿(y) = −2 < 0. It is easy to check that this local maximum is also a global
maximum for y ∈ [0,1]. Hence, for any y ∈ [0,1] the probability of peace in the
equilibrium of the split proposal game satisfies
P(y,1− y)≤ G(1/2) = (p−1/2)
2
(2p−1− α p2 )2
=
(2p−1)2
(4p−2−α p)2 < 1.
Then
P(x,1− x)≤ (2p−1)
2
(4p−2−α p)2 f or p(1−α)> 1/2.
￿
Corollary 1 In the game without communication where parameter values sat-
isfy inequality (2.2) each split offer leads to peace with probability less than
1/2.
Proof: Let p(1−α)> 1/2. By proposition (3) inequality
P(x,1− x)≤ (2p−1)
2
(4p−2−α p)2
holds. It is easy to check that inequality
P ≤ (2p−1)
2
(4p−2−α p)2 <
1
2
(2.8)
holds for p(1−α)> 1/2.
￿
2.3 Peaceful agreement in the unmediated
peace talk game
In this paragraph we calculate the ex ante probability of peaceful settlement in
the Bayesian-Nash equilibria of unmediated peace talk game. We assume here-
after that the conflict is not sufficiently costly to secure the peace with proba-
bility one. Hence, inequality (2.2) holds.
We consider a cheap talk where the message space is the product τ =M×M.
After learning their own type, players publicly and simultaneously send costless
messagesmi ∈M, i= 1,2. Denote the generic message profile bym=(m1,m2).
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Messages sent in this mechanism are unverifiable, except for the case of war
resolution.
For any given message profile m the mechanism may recommend to players
either acceptable or unacceptable split. An acceptable split in the peace talk
game is an element from the set of efficient outcomes Ye that might be accepted
with strictly positive probability by both players who observe the message pro-
file. The set of acceptable splits is denoted by X , X ⊂ Ye. The set X can be
represented by the share x for player 1 in recommendations. Recall that the
ex ante expected payoff of type ti = 0 is 1− p. Hence, by the symmetry of
players, X is equivalent to the interval [1− p, p]. The probability of recom-
mendation of acceptable split x ∈ [1− p, p] when the message profile is m is
denoted by q(m), q(m) ∈ [0,1]. The probability of recommendation of unac-
ceptable, war inducing split x /∈ X , is denoted by 1−q(m). A set of decisions is
the product set D= [1− p, p]× [0,1] with generic element (x,q).
Definition 3 A peace talk mechanism is a pair (τ, f ) where the decision rule
f : τ→D maps each pair of messages into a decision in D= [1− p, p]× [0,1].
We assume that no other peaceful mechanism is available. Hence, any uni-
lateral rejection of a split x proposed by mechanism (τ, f ) leads to war with
probability 1. The outcome induced by the mechanism (τ, f ) is either the effi-
cient split x or, in the case of unilateral or bilateral rejection of recommendation,
an inefficient outcome from the set Y \Ye as a result of war.
We consider the game G induced by the mechanism (τ, f ). In this game
player i adopts a strategy si : T →M which maps each type to a message.
Preferences of players in the game G are given by utility functions ui : T ×
M→ [0,1]. Utilities from a messages profile m= (m1,m2) are
u1(t,m) = q(m)x(m)+(1−q(m))π1(t)
and
u2(t,m) = q(m)(1− x(m))+(1−q(m))π2(t)
where π1(t) and π2(t) denote expected war payoffs of players when the type
profile is t. Let b0(.) be the uniform common prior probability distribution over
type profiles T . The game G is described by ({1,2},T,M,b0,(u1,u2)). De-
note by s(t1, t2) = (s1(ti),s2(t2)) the pair of messages generated by the strategy
profile (s1,s2) when realised types are (t1, t2).
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A pure strategy Bayesian-Nash Equilibrium ofG is a system of type-independent
believes b(.) = (b1(.),b2(.)) at every information set and a pair of strategies s
that are interim best response to the strategies used by the other player. We
compute the expected payoff Ui of player i with respect to the belief bi about
the type of opponent from interim perspective, after player i learns his own type.
Given the belief bi, the expected payoff for player i of strategy profile s is
Ubii (ti) =
￿ 1
0
u(t1, t2,s(t1, t2))dbi(t j),
where i ￿= j.
A direct mechanisms is a mechanism in which each player i fully or partially
identifies himself by sending a message mi ∈ T . If M = T then a truth telling
strategy for agent i is to reveal precisely its type, that is, si(ti) = ti. A direct
mechanism is Bayesian incentive compatible if it has a Bayesian equilibrium
(s∗1(ti),s∗2(t2)) such that s∗1(ti) = ti and s∗2(t2) = t2. We wish to find out if a deci-
sion rule f , such that the expected value of q for the rule f is higher than 1/2,
can be implemented as a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game induced by
some cheap talk mechanism. By the Revelation Principle for Bayesian equilib-
rium (see [12]), if a mechanism (τ, f ) implements decision rule f in Bayesian
equilibrium of the induced game, then the direct mechanism implementing f
is Bayesian incentive compatible. Hence, we restrict our consideration to di-
rect mechanisms (τ, f ). Fix the equilibrium strategy profile s∗ for mechanism
(τ, f ). Following the notation in [7], we denote by q∗(m) the probability that,
after observing each other’s message, both players accept the recommended
split x(m). Then the value of the prize for player 1 obtained from participation
in the mechanism (τ, f ) is x∗(t) = x(s∗(t)).
We evaluate the quality of the mechanism (τ, f ) by the probability q∗(m)
with which it is likely to avoid confrontation at the equilibrium, given the up-
dated beliefs of players about the type of the opponent. We assume that these
beliefs are formed according to Bayesian rule and updated in the light of ob-
served messages and the recommended split. We assume no commitment of
players to the mechanism, therefore it must be optimal ex post in the equilib-
rium of G to accept all peaceful splits proposed.
Let in the mechanism (τ, f ) both functions q(m) and x(m) are symmetric
across messages. This entails that
x(m1,m2) = x(m2,m1) and q(m1,m2) = q(m2,m1). (2.9)
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Hence,
x(y,y) = 1/2 f or any y ∈M.
In a pooling equilibrium of the game each player sends the same message irrele-
vant to his type. The outcome in this equilibrium coincides with the equilibrium
outcome of the agreement game without communication.
Our objective is to find a direct mechanism that maximizes the ex ante ex-
pected probability of peace
P = maxx(m),q(m)
￿
M
￿
M
q(m1,m2)dm2 dm1 (2.10)
across all mechanisms that satisfies the following two conditions. In the Bayesian-
Nash equilibrium of the induced game G each player’s strategy should satisfy
the interim incentive compatibility (IC) and the ex post individual rationality
(IR) (participation) constraints that will be defined in subsequent paragraphs
with respect to the message spaceM.
2.3.1 Full disclosure peace talk game
In this subsection we show a property of incentive compatible direct mechanism
mechanism (τ, f ) for the case where each player’s message space isM= T , i.e.,
M = [0,1]. This construction implicitly assumes that every type is certifiable,
that is, point estimates of fighting capacities of opponents can be certified by
external experts.
We consider symmetric mechanisms that satisfy conditions (2.9). We would
like to find a mechanism with splits x(m1,m2) and probabilities q(m1,m2) that
maximizes the ex ante probability of peace
maxx(m1,m2),q(m1,m2)
￿ 1
0
￿ 1
0
q(m1,m2)dm2 dm1 (2.11)
subject to two constraints. The equilibrium strategy profile in the induced game
must satisfy the ensuing interim incentive compatibility and ex post individual
rationality constraints.
Given the prior beliefs of players, the expected utility for type ti of player i
from participating in the induced game G and truthfully reporting mi = ti is
Ui(ti|ti) =
￿ 1
0
q(ti, t j)xi(ti, t j)+(1−q(ti, t j))wi(ti, t j)dt j
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and the expected utility from falsely reporting type m￿i ￿= ti is
Ui(m￿i|ti) =
￿ 1
0
q(m￿i, t j)xi(m￿i, t j)+(1−q(m￿i, t j))wi(ti, t j)dt j.
IC constraint states that for any ti,m￿i ∈M
Ui(ti|ti)≥Ui(m￿i|ti) and Ui(m￿i|m￿i)≥Ui(ti|m￿i). (2.12)
It must be optimal in the equilibrium ofG to accept all peaceful splits proposed.
Recall that if type profile is (t1, t2) then the war payoff of player i is wi(ti, t j) =
p(ti, t j)θ(ti, t j). Given that messages are public and truthfully reveal types, the
ex post IR constraints are
x(m1,m2)≥ w1(m1,m2) and 1− x(m1,m2)≥ w2(m1,m2) (2.13)
for all m1,m2.
Proposition 4 Let the direct peace talk mechanism be incentive-compatible.
Then the probability of recommendation of peace inducing split is not constant
in reported types.
Proof: Let the direct mechanismwith decision rule f (m1,m2)= (x(m1,m2),q(m1,m2))
be incentive-compatible. Let m1,m￿1 ∈ [0,1] and m1 ￿= m￿1. The ex ante IC con-
straint (2.12) for player 1 of type m1 yields￿ 1
0
q(m1,m2)x(m1,m2)dm2+
￿ 1
0
(1−q(m1,m2))w1(m1,m2)dm2 ≥ (2.14)
≥
￿ 1
0
q(m￿1,m2)x(m￿1,m2)dm2+
￿ 1
0
(1−q(m￿1,m2))w1(m1,m2)dm2.
For player 1 of type m￿1 the ex ante IC constraint yields￿ 1
0
q(m￿1,m2)x(m￿1,m2)dm2+
￿ 1
0
(1−q(m￿1,m2))w1(m￿1,m2)dm2 ≥ (2.15)
≥
￿ 1
0
q(m1,m2)x(m1,m2)dm2+
￿ 1
0
(1−q(m1,m2))w1(m￿1,m2)dm2.
Assume that q(m￿1,m2) = q(m1,m2) for any m2 ∈M. Then inequality (2.14)
yields that ∃m∗2 ∈M such that
x(m1,m∗2)≥ x(m￿1,m∗2),
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while inequality (2.15) yields that ∃m∗∗2 ∈M such that
x(m￿1,m∗∗2 )≥ x(m1,m∗∗2 )
holds. As m1,m￿1 are arbitrary, it implies x(m1,m2) = x(m2). Applying the
same reasoning to player 2 we obtain x(m1,m2) = x(m1). Hence, x(m1,m2) =
const = K. That is, all types expect the same share in the equilibrium without
war. The ex ante IR constraint for the highest type of player 1 states
￿ 1
0
x(1,m2)dm2 = K ≥
￿ 1
0
pθ(1,m2)dm2 = p
￿ 1
0
(1−αm2)dm2 = (2.16)
= p(1− α
2
)>
1
2
.
Similarly, the ex ante IR constraint for the highest type of player 2 states
￿ 1
0
x(m1,1)dm1 = K ≥
￿ 1
0
pθ(m1,1)dm1 = p
￿ 1
0
(1−αm1)dm1 = (2.17)
= p(1− α
2
)>
1
2
.
Taking expectations we obtain the same constant
￿ 1
0
￿ 1
0
x(m1,m2)dm2 dm1 = K.
Therefore, the IR constraint is violated because
K+K ≥ 2p(1− α
2
)> 1,
a contadiction. ￿
2.3.2 Peace talk game with partial revelation
In this subsection we consider the optimal direct mechanism that allows for
partial revelation of types. Truthful estimates of player’s type certified by ex-
perts can be more or less informative. Precise estimates might be available if
information can be acquired costless and covertly. Otherwise, it might not be an
equilibrium strategy for any of players to allow assessment of his own type as
accurate as possible. We assume that for each player i experts observe only an
interval that contains ti. A partial type may be any subset of T = [0,1]. In gen-
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eral, partial types may be overlapping and they have to be exhaustive in order
to define incentive compatibility of a mechanism.
Definition 4 Let {T1,T2, ...,Tn} be a finite set of intervals such that ∪nj=1Ti =
[0,1]. We say that a report Ti of player j is truthful if t j ∈ Ti, that is, if the partial
type Ti contains the player’ s true type t j.
We will design a mechanism that reaches socially efficient outcome when
the partial types are the least informative. We consider a mechanism in which
messages reveal the type of the sender with precision up to the division of the
type space to two intersecting subintervals [0,1/2] and [1/2,1]. Without loss
of generality, we restrict the message space to the set M = [h, l]. A truthful
strategy for player i in the induced game is to report type l if ti ≤ 1/2 and h
if ti ≥ 1/2. The symmetry of recommended splits x(m1,m2) and probabilities
q(m1,m2) across players yields
x(l, l) = x(h,h) = 1/2 and x≡ x(h, l) = 1− x(l,h).
The three unknown probabilities for the mechanism are
ql ≡ q(l, l), qh ≡ q(h,h), qm ≡ q(h, l) = q(l,h).
There are many pooling equilibria of the game (M,(x,q)). In order to con-
struct one of them, assume that one of the players sends a message h with
probability one. Assume that in the case of messages profile (h,h) the rule of-
fers equal shares with probability q(h,h) = 1. Assume that for messages profile
(h, l) the rule offers π(1/2) to the player who sends a message l. Since each
low type prefers to send a message h it means that only message h is sent by
any type of each player in the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the induced game.
In each pooling equilibrium of the game induced by the mechanism the ex ante
probability that the peace recommendation will be accepted by both players is
the same as the probability of peace in the split proposal game without commu-
nication.
We will show that there exists a separating equilibrium of the game induced
by (M,(x,q)) in which each partial type sends different message. In a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium of the induced game, the peace maximizing splits and proba-
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bilities should solve the problem
maxx,ql ,qh,qm
￿
1
4
ql +
1
2
qm+
1
4
qh
￿
, (2.18)
that corresponds to problem (2.11) and is subject to the probability constraints
0≤ ql ≤ 1, 0≤ qm ≤ 1, 0≤ qh ≤ 1 (2.19)
and the following IC and IR constraints.
In a truthful mechanism messages reveal types. The interim expected prize
in a war with reported low type is
￿ 1/2
0
(1−αtim2)dm2 = 12 −
αti
8
(2.20)
while the expected prize in a war with reported high type is
￿ 1
1/2
(1−αtim2)dm2 = 12 −
3αti
8
. (2.21)
Then the expected payoff of a high type from waging a war with reported
low type is
p
￿ 1/2
0
(1−αtim2)dm2 = p(12 −
αti
8
).
We require that the share x of a reported high type makes war against a self-
reported low type unprofitable. Hence, we require
x≥ p(1
2
− αti
8
)
for any ti > 1/2. Then the ex post IR constraint for the high type share states
x≥ p(1
2
− α
16
). (2.22)
Similarly, the share 1− x of the low type should make it unprofitable to wage a
war with reported high type. The expected payoff of a low type from waging a
war with reported high type is
(1− p)
￿ 1
1/2
(1−αtim2)dm2) = (1− p)(12 −
3αti
8
).
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Hence, we require
1− x≥ (1− p)(1
2
− 3αti
8
)
for any ti ≤ 1/2. Then the ex post IR constraint for the low type share states
1− x≥ 1
2
(1− p). (2.23)
Clearly, condition (2.2) implies that inequality x= p(12− α16)> 1−x= 12(1− p)
is satisfied.
In the construction of the interim IC constraints we assume that misreport-
ing is never followed by a failure to comply with recommendation of the public
randomization device. We check later in the section that the solution of the
program gives no incentive for players to deviate by waging a war after misre-
porting.
Denote by πl(ti) the expected payoff of player i of type ti ≤ 1/2 from a war
with low type. Denote by πh(ti) the expected payoff of player i of type ti ≥ 1/2
from a war with high type.
Then interim IC constraint for a player i of type ti ≤ 1/2 is
1
2
(
ql
2
+(1−ql)πl(ti))+ 12(qm(1−x)+(1−qm)(1− p)
￿ 1
1/2
(1−αtim2)dm2)≥
1
2
(qmx+(1−qm)πl(ti))+ 12(
qh
2
+(1−qh)(1− p)
￿ 1
1/2
(1−αtim2)dm2),
equivalent to
ql
2
−qlπl(ti)+qm(1− x)−qm(1− p)
￿ 1
1/2
(1−αtim2)dm2 ≥ (2.24)
qmx−qmπl(ti)+ qh2 −qh(1− p)
￿ 1
1/2
(1−αtim2)dm2
for all ti≤ 1/2. The LHS is the expected payoff from sending a message l while
the RHS is the expected payoff from exaggerating strength.
Similarly, the interim IC constraint for a player i of type ti > 1/2 is
1
2
(qmx+(1−qm)p
￿ 1/2
0
(1−αtim2)dm2)+ 12(
qh
2
+(1−qh)πh(ti))≥
1
2
(
ql
2
+(1−ql)p
￿ 1/2
0
(1−αtim2)dm2)+ 12(qm(1− x)+(1−qm)πh(ti)),
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equivalent to
qmx−qmp
￿ 1/2
0
(1−αtim2)dm2+ qh2 −qhπh(ti)≥ (2.25)
ql
2
−ql p
￿ 1/2
0
(1−αtim2)dm2+qm(1− x)−qmπh(ti)
for all ti > 1/2. The LHS is the expected payoff from sending a message h
while the RHS is the expected payoff from hiding strength.
By substituting prize values (2.20) and (2.21) in inequalities (2.25) and
(2.24) respectively, we obtain IC constraints
ql
2
−qlπl(ti)+qm(1− x)−qm(1− p)(12 −
3αti
8
)≥ (2.26)
≥ qmx−qmπl(ti)+ qh2 −qh(1− p)(
1
2
− 3αti
8
)
for all ti ≤ 1/2 and
qmx−qmp(12−
αti
8
)+
qh
2
−qhπh(ti)≥ ql2 −ql p(
1
2
− αti
8
)+qm(1−x)−qmπh(ti)
(2.27)
for all ti > 1/2.
We will be using the following lemma.
Lemma 2 For parameters satisfying condition (2.2), expected payoff πl(ti) of
a low type ti ≤ 1/2 from a war with low type satisfies
πl(0) =
1
2
(1− p)≤ πl(ti)≤ πl(12) =
1
2
p(1− α
8
)< 1/2. (2.28)
and expected payoff πh(ti) of a high type ti ≥ 1/2 from a war with high type
satisfies
πh(1/2) =
1
2
(1− p)(1− 3
8
α)≤ πh(ti)≤ πh(1) = 12 p(1−
3
4
α)< 1/2. (2.29)
Proof: Expected payoff of type ti ≤ 1/2 from a war with type t j ≤ 1/2 is
πl(ti)=
￿ 1/2
0
p(ti, t j)θ(ti, t j)dt j =
￿ ti
0
p(1−αt1t2)dt2+
￿ 1/2
ti
(1− p)(1−αtit j)dt j =
=
1− p
2
+
￿
2p−1− α(1− p)
8
￿
ti+
￿
α(1− p)
2
− α p
2
￿
t3i . (2.30)
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It is easy to check that for ti ∈ [0,1/2] and parameter values satisfying condition
(2.2)
∂πl(ti)
∂ ti
> 0.
Hence, πl(ti) is increasing in ti for ti ∈ [0,1/2]. Expected payoff of a higher
type ti > 1/2 from a war with higher type t j > 1/2 is
πh(ti)=
￿ 1
1/2
p(ti, t j)θ(ti, t j)dt j =
￿ ti
1/2
p(1−αtit j)dt j+
￿ 1
ti
(1− p)(1−αtit j)dt j =
= 1− 3p
2
+
￿
2p−1− α
2
+
5α p
8
￿
ti+
α(1−2p)
2
t3i . (2.31)
It is easy to check that for ti ∈ [1/2,1] and parameters values satisfying condi-
tion (2.2)
∂πh(ti)
∂ ti
> 0.
Hence, πh(ti) is increasing in ti for ti ∈ [1/2,1]. ￿
Consider the game G induced by the mechanism g= ([h, l]× [h, l], f ) where
the decision rule f is determined by split function x(m1,m2) and war probabil-
ity function q(m1,m2) that satisfy IC constraints (2.26) and (2.27), probability
constraints (2.19), and solve problem (2.18).
Proposition 5 There is an unique best separating equilibrium of the game G.
The ex ante probability of peace in this equilibrium equals
P =
1
2
+
8−16p+4α p−3α
2(2α p−3a−8) .
Proof: The proof is by construction. We calculate parameters of the direct
mechanism and we show that both types have no incentive to deviate from rec-
ommendations of the public randomization device.
We rearrange the IC constraint (2.26) for the low type and we consider a re-
laxed problem: maximizing (2.18) subject to the high type ex post IR constraint
x≥ p(1
2
− α
16
), (2.32)
the probability constraints
ql ≤ 1, 0≤ qm ≤ 1, qh ≤ 1, (2.33)
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and the low type ex ante IC constraint
ql
￿
1
2
−πl(ti)
￿
≥ qm
￿
2x−1−πl(ti)+(1− p)
￿
1
2
− 3αti
8
￿￿
+ (2.34)
+qh
￿
1
2
− (1− p)
￿
1
2
− 3αti
8
￿￿
.
1. By Lemma (2) inequality 12 − πl(ti) > 0 holds for any ti ≤ 1/2. Then
setting ql = 1 maximizes the LHS of (2.34) and does not affect the RHS.
Simultaneously, it does not affect the high type ex post IR constraint
(2.32).
2. As 12 − (1− p)(12 − 3αti8 )> 0 for any ti ≤ 1/2, it follows that at the maxi-
mal feasible value of qh the IC constraint (2.34) binds for some t∗i ≤ 1/2.
In the light of step (1) we rewrite the IC constraint for the low type as
1
2
≥ (1−qm)πl(ti)+(qh−qm)(1− p)3αti8 − (qh−qm)
(1− p)
2
+ (2.35)
+qm(2x−1)+qh12 .
Hence, t∗i maximizes the value of (1−qm)πl(ti)+(qh−qm)(1− p)3αti8 .
3. We want to show that the high type ex post IR constraint (2.32) binds.
Suppose that it is slack, that is, x > p(12 − α16). Then it is possible to
reduce x without violating the IC constraint (2.35) because x appears in
the RHS of (2.35) with coefficient 2qm≥ 0. It makes the constraint (2.35)
slack also for t∗i , a contradiction with (2). Therefore, the high type ex post
IR constraint (2.32) binds.
4. Steps (1) and (3) yield
x= p
￿
1
2
− α
16
￿
and ql = 1. (2.36)
We want to show that qh ≥ qm. In the light of equalities (2.36) the con-
straint (2.35) which is binding for ti = t∗i becomes
1
2
−πl(t∗i ) = qm
￿
p(1− α
8
)−1−πl(t∗i )+(1− p)(
1
2
− 3αt
∗
i
8
)
￿
+
(2.37)
+qh
￿
1
2
− (1− p)(1
2
− 3αt
∗
i
8
)
￿
.
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As 12 − (1− p)(12 − 3αt
∗
i
8 )> 0,
qh=
1
2 −πl(t∗i )
1
2 − (1− p)(12 −
3αt∗i
8 )
+qm
1− p(1− α8 )+πl(t∗i )− (1− p)(12 − 3αt
∗
i
8 )
1
2 − (1− p)(12 −
3αt∗i
8 )
(2.38)
is well defined. We rearrange (2.38) as
qh= qm
1
2 − (1− p)(12 − 3αt
∗
i
8 )
1
2 − (1− p)(12 −
3αt∗i
8 )
+
qm(1− p(1− α8 )− 12 +πl(t∗i ))+ 12 −πl(t∗i )
1
2 − (1− p)(12 −
3αt∗i
8 )
=
(2.39)
= qm+
qm(1− p(1− α8 ))+(1−qm)(12 −πl(t∗i ))
1
2 − (1− p)(12 −
3αt∗i
8 )
.
By lemma (2) inequality 12 − πl(t∗i ) > 0 holds. Hence, the ratio on the
RHS of (2.39) is positive for any qm ≤ 1. Therefore, qh ≥ qm.
5. We want to show that the solution of the relaxed problem is ql = qh = 1
and qm = 8−16p+4α p−3α2α p−3a−8 .
In the light of step (1) we rewrite the IC constraint (2.34) as
1
2
≥ (1−qm)πl(ti)+(qh−qm)(1− p)3αti8 −(qh−qm)
(1− p)
2
+qm(2x−1)+qh12 .
(2.40)
As qh−qm ≥ 0 and 1−qm ≥ 0, lemma (2) implies that the value of (1−
qm)πl(ti)+ (qh− qm)(1− p)3αti8 is maximal for ti = 1/2. Therefore, the
IC constraint (2.40) binds for t∗i = 1/2. Then constraint
1
2
≥ (1−qm)12 p(1−
α
8
)+(qh−qm)(1− p)3α16 − (qh−qm)
(1− p)
2
+
(2.41)
+qm(2x−1)+qh12
binds.
We substitute x in the binding constraint (2.41) and we obtain
1= (1−qm)p(1− α8 )+(qh−qm)(1− p)
3α
8
− (qh−qm)(1− p)+
(2.42)
+qm(p(2− α4 )−2)+qh.
2.3 Peaceful agreement in the unmediated
peace talk game 35
Clearly, 2α p−3a−8< 0 for any feasible values of α and p. Hence,
qm = qh
3α p−8p−3α
2α p−3a−8 +
8−8p+α p
2α p−3a−8 (2.43)
is well defined. In the light of step (1) we simplify the objective function
(2.18) and maximize
maxqh,qm {2qm+qh} . (2.44)
Substituting qm by the RHS of (2.43) we maximize expression
W =
2(8−8p+α p)
2α p−3a−8 +qh
￿
1+
2(3α p−8p−3α)
2α p−3a−8
￿
.
We note that coefficient of qh is positive and the maximization ofW re-
quires maximization of qh. However, the value of qh is constrained by
inequality in (2.33). Setting qh = 1 and solving for qm in (2.43) yields
qm =
3α p−8p−3α
2α p−3a−8 +
8−8p+α p
2α p−3a−8 =
8−16p+4α p−3α
2α p−3a−8 . (2.45)
It is easy to check that 0< qm ≤ 1 for any feasible values of p and α . In-
deed, 2α p−3a−8< 0 and inequality 8−16p+4α p−3α < 0 holds for
any values of parameters α and p that satisfy condition (2.2). The RHS
of (2.45) achieves its maximal value of 8−α8+α ≤ 1 for p= 1. Therefore, the
solution ql = qh = 1 and qm =
8−16p+4α p−3α
2α p−3a−8 is admissible.
6. We want to show that solution constructed in step (5) satisfies all con-
straints of the initial problem. The ex post IR constraint(2.23) for the
low type share is trivially satisfied when x = p(12 − α16), as 1− x = 1−
p(12 − α16) ≥ 12(1− p). By substituting ql = qh = 1 the high-type ex ante
IC constraint (2.27) becomes
1
2
−πh(ti)+qmx−qmp(12−
αti
8
)≥ qm(1−x)−qmπh(ti)+ 12− p(
1
2
− αti
8
)
(2.46)
We will show that inequality (2.46) is satisfied for any ti ≥ 1/2.
Recall that by inequality (2.29) of lemma (2) inequality
p(
1
2
− αti
8
)≥ πh(ti) (2.47)
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holds for ti ≥ 1/2. Then
(1−qm)p(12 −
αti
8
)≥ (1−qm)πh(ti) (2.48)
because qm < 1. We rewrite (2.48) as
−πh(ti)−qmp(12 −
αti
8
)≥−qmπh(ti)− p(12 −
αti
8
). (2.49)
We note that summing inequality (2.49) with inequality qmx> qm(1−x),
that holds because x > 1− x, we obtain (2.46), which had to be proved.
The probability constraints (2.19) are obviously satisfied.
By lemma (2) the value of split x = p(12 − α16) implies that neither the low
nor the high type has any incentive to deviate by waging a war after misreport-
ing, learning the type of the opponent and receiving a peaceful recommendation
by the mechanism. Hence, truthfully reporting type and following the recom-
mendation is a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in the game induced by the mecha-
nism. This equilibrium is unique up to the strategy of the player with relative
strength ti = 1/2 who can randomize between reporting h and l. Therefore, in
the best separating equilibrium of the peace talk game the ex ante probability
of peace is
P =
1
4
+
8−16p+4α p−3α
2(2α p−3a−8) +
1
4
.
￿
We note that ex ante probability of peace in the separating equilibrium of
the peace talk game satisfiesP > 12 for any parameters values. Therefore, by
inequality (2.8), for parameter values satisfying condition (2.2) a peace talk
reduces the ex ante probability of conflict compared to all equilibria of the split
offer game with no communication.
In the ex post stage, as a result of updated beliefs about the opponent’s war
capacity, parties might not follow a war recommendation and seek bilaterally
another peaceful mechanism. However, the lack of commitment to fight after a
war recommendation can only increase the ex ante probability of peace in the
case of communication.
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2.4 Probability of peace in mediation games
We consider a mediated communication game studied by Horner, Morelli and
Squintani (2010) in [11]. Typically, the mediator is a third party that has no
private information but helps others to reach an agreement. The mediator who
evaluates the case is expected to adopt a neutral stance in his advisory role.
Nevertheless, a typical mediator has his own agenda. The fundamental assump-
tion in our model is that the objective of a mediator is to maximise the ex ante
probability of peaceful resolution of the conflict and this objective is common
knowledge. The mediator cannot enforce his recommendations. We assume
that the mediator can fully commit to the outcome induced by the mechanism
and that channels of communication of the privately informed players with the
mediator are perfect and immune to disclosure of confidential information.
The timing of the mediation game is as follows. After observing his own
type, each player sends simultaneously a message. The mediator receives mes-
sages and offers a mechanism. Parties know how their messages are to be used.
The mediator commits himself to a policy rule that maximises the probability
of peace. By the Revelation Principle for Bayesian equilibrium we restrict our
consideration to direct mechanisms offered by the mediator.
In contrast to the peace talk game, messages sent by parties to the medi-
ator are non publicly observed. The mediator randomly selects a split from a
full menu, but this recommendation is made after learning the messages profile
m. Following the model by Horner, Morelli and Squintani (2010) presented in
[11], we assume that a split (x,1− x) is recommended according to some cu-
mulative distribution function F(x|m) over a set of possibilities where there is
only one recommendation in the support of F leading to war, the split (0,1).
After receiving a recommendation opponents play an agreement game with the
proposed split.
S. Baliga and T. Sjostrom (2011) express in [1] the view that ’the mech-
anisms are clearly not meant to be descriptive of real-world institutions. For
example, they typically require the agents to report "all they know" before any
decision is reached, an extreme form of centralized decision making hardly
ever encountered in the real world.’ Several papers study the impact of the
alignment of preferences of the sender and the receiver on the amount of in-
formation communicated in equilibrium (see [9] and [10] by Kamenica and
Gentzkow (2009,2011)). The authors show that more aligned preferences can
make the optimal signal either more or less informative depending on the de-
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fault action of the receiver. In general, parties have a control over the precision
of the information shared with the mediator. We relax the assumption of full
disclosure of private information to the mediator. We consider mediation games
in which players can only partially reveal their types.
2.4.1 Revelation of information through the choice of recom-
mendation
We consider equilibria in which messages sent to the mediator reveal the type
of the sender with precision up to the division of the type space to subin-
tervals [0,1/2] and [1/2,1]. Given the messages profile m = (m1,m2) where
mi ∈ {h, l}, the mediator recommends a split chosen from a set of possibilities.
Following the model of Horner et al., we consider only direct mechanisms with
discrete and symmetric randomisation function F .
The mediator has to decide how informative should be his recommendation
for players. Players can choose to go to war at any time. They use information
learned from the mediator’s recommendation for updating their belief about the
type of opponent. Hence, in the construction of the menu of lotteries F(x|m),
the mediator should avoid releasing to players unnecessary information about
opponent’s type. Following the recommendation should be optimal given play-
ers’ types and the updated beliefs about the opponent’s type, where beliefs are
consistent with Bayes’ rule.
In general, the mediator can assign a positive probability to a number of
peaceful splits. Following the analysis in [11], we restrict our attention to medi-
ators whose set of recommendations R= {(1/2,1/2),(x,1−x),(1−x,x),(0,1)},
where x > 1− x, contains only four elements. Clearly, the split (0,1) induces
war with probability 1. We consider a distribution function F : {h, l}×{h, l}→
[0,1]4 characterized by five probabilities. If recommendations (x,1− x) and
(x,1− x) are made only for messages profiles (l,h) and (h, l) then with proba-
bility 1/2 in the truthful Bayesian equilibrium players learn ex post the partial
type of the opponent. Such a mechanism can not be incentive compatible for the
partial type l. Hence, an incentive compatible mediation programme should of-
fer with positive probability recommendations (x,1−x) and (x,1−x) to players
with the same partial type. In the following paragraphs we study properties of
mediation programmes that recommend with positive probability uneven split
of the prize not only in the case of heterogeneous messages profiles but also in
the case of (l, l) profile or in the case of (h,h) profile.
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2.4.2 Mediation programme mixing for low types
In this section we consider the mediation programme given by
F(h,h) = (qh,0,0,1−qh), F(h, l) = (qm, pm,0,1−qm− pm), (2.50)
F(l, l) = (ql, pl, pl,1−ql−2pl).
By symmetry F(l,h) = (qm,0, pm,1− qm− pm). For this type of programmes
the mediator chooses the value of x and probabilities that maximize the proba-
bility of peace
maxx,ql ,qh,qm,pl ,pm
￿
1
4
qh+
1
2
(qm+ pm)+
1
4
(ql +2pl)
￿
, (2.51)
subject to the probability constraints
0≤ ql ≤ 1, 0≤ qm ≤ 1, 0≤ qh ≤ 1,0≤ pl ≤ 1, 0≤ pm ≤ 1. (2.52)
The objective function is also subject to IC and IR constraints that follow.
First, we consider two ex post IR constraints for the high type share. A
reported high type is recommended x with probability pm. After this recom-
mendation he updates his belief about the type of the opponent and Pr[m2 =
l| x∧m1 = h] = 1. We require that war is unprofitable ex post for a reported
high type who receives a peaceful recommendation x. Hence, an ex post IR
constraint for the high type share states
xpm ≥ p
￿
1
2
− αti
8
￿
for any ti ≥ 1/2, which is equivalent to
xpm ≥ p
￿
1
2
− α
16
￿
. (2.53)
A reported high type is proposed 1/2 with probability qh+qm. After this recom-
mendation he updates his belief about the type of the opponent as Pr[1/2 |m1 =
h] =P[m2 = h| 1/2∧m1 = h]+P[m2 = l | 1/2∧m1 = h]. Hence, another ex post
IR constraint for the high type share states
1
2
(qh+qm)≥ qhπh(ti)+qmp
￿
1
2
− αti
8
￿
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for any ti ≥ 1/2. Clearly, this inequality holds for any qh and qm which satisfy
the probability constraints because πh(ti)< 12 by lemma (2).
Next, we consider three ex post IR constraints for the low type share. A
reported low type is recommended x with probability pl . After this recom-
mendation he updates his belief about the type of the opponent and Pr[m2 =
l| x∧m1 = l] = 1. Hence, war is unprofitable ex post for a low type who re-
ceives a recommendation x if
xpl ≥ πl(ti)
for any ti ≤ 1/2. Therefore, by lemma (2) an IR constraint for a low type share
states
xpl ≥ p
￿
1
2
− α
16
￿
. (2.54)
A reported low type is recommended 1− x with probability Pr[1− x|m1 =
l] = P[m2 = h| 1− x∧m1 = l] + P[m2 = l| 1− x∧m1 = l] = pm + pl . We
require that war is unprofitable ex post for a low type who receives a peaceful
recommendation 1− x. Hence, another ex post IR constraint for the low type
share states
(pm+ pl)(1− x)≥ pm(1− p)
￿
1
2
− 3αti
8
￿
+ plπl(ti) (2.55)
for any ti ≤ 1/2.
A reported low type is proposed 1/2 with probability Pr[1/2|m1 = l] =
P[m2= h| 1/2∧m1= l]+P[m2= l| 1/2∧m1= l] = qm+ql . We require that war
is unprofitable ex post for a low type who receives a peaceful recommendation
1/2. Hence, another ex post IR constraint for the low type share states
1
2
(qm+ql)≥ qm(1− p)
￿
1
2
− 3αti
8
￿
+qlπl(ti)
for any ti ≤ 1/2. This IR constraint is clearly satisfied because πl(ti) < 12 by
lemma (2).
In general, the mediator is not endowed with any power to enforce compli-
ance with his recommendations. However, in the construction of the interim
IC constraints for the mediation game we assume that misreporting is never
followed by a failure to comply with recommendation, similarly to the IC con-
straints for the peace talk game. We will check later in the section if the solution
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of the program, in which the recommendation is not enforced, provides some
incentive for players to deviate by waging a war after misreporting.
Truthful reporting by a high type requires that the following interim IC
constraint
1
2
((1−qh)πh(ti)+qh12)+
1
2
((1−qm− pm)p(12−
αti
8
)+qm
1
2
+ pmx)≥ (2.56)
≥ 1
2
￿
(1−qm− pm)πh(ti)+qm12 + pm(1− x)
￿
+
+
1
2
￿
(1−ql−2pl)p(12 −
αti
8
)+ql
1
2
+ plx+ pl(1− x)
￿
is satisfied for all ti ≥ 1/2.
Truthful reporting by a low type requires that the following interim IC con-
straint
1
2
￿
(1−qm− pm)(1− p)(12 −
3αti
8
)+qm
1
2
+ pm(1− x)
￿
+ (2.57)
+
1
2
￿
(1−ql−2pl)πl(ti)+ql 12 + plx+ pl(1− x)
￿
≥
≥ 1
2
((1−qh)(1− p)(12 −
3αti
8
)+qh
1
2
)+
1
2
((1−qm− pm)πl(ti)+qm12 + pmx)
is satisfied for all ti ≤ 1/2.
Consider the gameG induced by the mediation programme (2.50) where the
decision rule satisfies IC constraints (2.57) and (2.56), probability constraints
(2.52), and solves the problem (2.51).
Proposition 6 There is an unique best separating equilibrium of the game G
induced by the mediation programme (2.50). The ex ante probability of peace
in this equilibrium equals
Pmed =
1
2
+
32p−24+3α−16α p
2(8+3α)
.
Proof: The proof is by construction. We calculate parameters of the optimal
mediation programme and we show that both types have no incentive to deviate
from recommendations of the mediator.
For the sake of convenience we change the parametrisation of the relaxed
program by introducing four variables. We set sh ≡ qh, sm ≡ qm+ pm and sl ≡
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ql +2pl . Additionally, we denote by
b=
1
2
qm+ xpm
the expected payoff of reported high type in the case of peaceful agreement with
a low type. We note that the expected payoff of reported low type in the case of
peaceful agreement with a high type is
1
2
qm+(1− x)pm = sm−b
and the expected payoff of reported low type in the case of peaceful agreement
with a low type is
1
2
ql + xpl +(1− x)pl = 12ql + pl =
1
2
sl.
We solve the following relaxed problem:
maxb,sl ,sm,sh
￿
1
4
sh+
1
2
sm+
1
4
sl
￿
, (2.58)
subject to the probability constraints
sl ≤ 1, 0≤ sm ≤ 1, 0≤ sh ≤ 1. (2.59)
The interim IR constraint requires that, after learning its own type but before
receiving any recommendation, participation in the mechanism and following
all recommendations is at least as profitable for a player as going to war. The
interim IR constraint for the high type states
1
2
(sh
1
2
+(1− sh)πh(ti))+ 12(b+(1− sm)p(
1
2
− αti
8
))≥ 1
2
πh(ti)+
1
2
p(
1
2
− αti
8
)
for any ti ≥ 1/2, which is equivalent to
sh(
1
2
−πh(ti))+b− smp(12 −
αti
8
)≥ 0 (2.60)
for any ti ≥ 1/2.
The interim IC constraint for the low type states
1
2
(
1
2
sl +(1− sl)πl(ti))+ 12((sm−b)+(1− sm)(1− p)(
1
2
− 3αti
8
))≥
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1
2
(b+(1− sm)πl(ti))+ 12(sh
1
2
+(1− sh)(1− p)(12 −
3αti
8
))
for any ti ≤ 1/2, which is equivalent to
sl(
1
2
−πl(ti))+sm−sm(1− p)(12−
3αti
8
)≥ 2b−smπl(ti)+sh(12−(1− p)(
1
2
− 3αti
8
))
(2.61)
for any ti ≤ 1/2.
1. We note that sl appears only in right-hand side of the low type interim IC
constraint and this right-hand side is increasing in sl because by lemma
(2) πl(ti)≤ 12 . Hence, sl = 1 in the solution.
2. We note that by lemma (2) the coefficient of sh in the right -hand side of
the high type interim IR constraint is positive as well, and the coefficient
1
2 − (1− p)(12 − 3αti8 ) in the left-hand side of the low type interim IC
constraint is also positive. Hence, the low type interim IC constraint
must be binding for some ti ≤ 1/2 in the solution of relaxed problem,
otherwise we could increase sh thus increasing the value of the objective
function, without violating the high type interim IR constraint.
3. We note that the high type interim IR constraint must be binding for some
ti ≥ 1/2 in the solution of relaxed problem, otherwise we could decrease
b and make the low type interim IC constraint slack.
4. We would like to show that sh > sm in the solution of relaxed problem,
which implies that the high type interim IC constraint binds for ti = 1/2.
Then we show that the interim IR constraint for the high type binds for
ti = 1.
In the light of step one, the constraint (2.61) which binds for ti = t∗i be-
comes
1
2
−πl(t∗i )+ smπl(t∗i )−2b+ sm
1
2
+ sm
￿
1
2
− (1− p)(1
2
− 3αt
∗
i
8
)
￿
=
= sh
￿
1
2
− (1− p)(1
2
− 3αt
∗
i
8
)
￿
.
As 12 − (1− p)(12 − 3αti8 )> 0 for any ti, parameter
sh = sm+
1
2 −πl(t∗i )+ smπl(t∗i )+ sm 12 −2b
1
2 − (1− p)(12 −
3αt∗i
8 )
(2.62)
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is well defined. We would like to show that the second term in the right-
hand side of (4.8) is positive. Clearly, 12 − (1− p)(12 − 3αt
∗
i
8 ) > 0. It
remains to show that inequality
1
2
−πl(t∗i )+ smπl(t∗i )+ sm
1
2
−2b> 0 (2.63)
holds.
The constraint (2.60) binds for some ti = t∗∗i , therefore
b= smp
￿
1
2
− αt
∗∗
i
8
￿
− sh
￿
1
2
−πh(t∗∗i )
￿
.
We note that 12 − πh(t∗∗i ) > 0 by lemma (2). Hence, b ≤ smp12 for any
feasible sh ≥ 0.
Therefore,
1
2
−πl(t∗i )+ smπl(t∗i )+ sm
1
2
−2b> 1
2
+(sm−1)πl(t∗i )+ sm
1
2
− smp.
(2.64)
We note that in the solution of relaxed problem sm− 1 ≤ 0. Hence, the
right-hand side of (4.10) is minimal when the value of πl(t∗i ) is maximal,
that is, for ti = 1/2. Hence,
1
2
+(sm−1)πl(t∗i )+ sm
1
2
− smp≥ 12 +(sm−1)
p
2
(1− α
8
)+ sm(
1
2
− p) =
=
1
2
− p
2
+
α p
16
+sm(
p
2
(1−α
8
)+
1
2
− p)= 1
2
− p
2
+
α p
16
+sm(
1
2
− p
2
−α p
16
)=
= g(sm).
For parameter values for which 12 − p2 − α p16 > 0 the value of g(sm) is
minimal for sm = 0. Then g(0) = 12 − p2 + α p16 > 0 for any parameters
values. For parameter values for which 12− p2 − α p16 < 0 the value of g(sm)
is minimal for sm = 1. Then the minimal value of g(sm) is g(1) = 1− p>
0. Hence, for any parameters values g(sm) > 0 and inequality (4.9) is
satisfied.
Therefore, in the light of equation (4.8) we conclude that sh > sm in the
solution of relaxed problem. In the light of step 1 we rewrite the interim
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IC constraint for the low type (2.61) as
1
2
+ sm− sm(1− p)12 ≥
≥ 2b+(1− sm)πl(ti)+ sh12 − sh(1− p)
1
2
+(sh− sm)(1− p)3αti8 .
Hence, the right hand side of this IC constraint is maximal for ti = 1/2
because 1− sm ≥ 0, sh− sm > 0, and by lemma (2) πl(ti) is maximal for
ti = 1/2. Therefore, the interim IC constraint for the low type binds for
ti = 1/2.
It is easy to check that for sh > sm and ti ∈ [1/2,1] the value of expression
smpαti8 − shπh(ti) is minimal for ti = 1. Hence, the IR constraint for the
high type binds for ti = 1. Therefore, the IR constraint
sh
￿
1
2
−πh(1)
￿
+b− smp
￿
1
2
− α
8
￿
≥ 0
and the IC constraint
1
2
−πl(1/2)+ sm− sm(1− p)
￿
1
2
− 3α
16
￿
≥
≥ 2b− smπl(1/2)+ sh
￿
1
2
− (1− p)
￿
1
2
− 3α
16
￿￿
bind.
5. We rewrite the constraints of the relaxed problem by substituting
b= smp(
1
2
− α
8
)− sh
￿
1
2
− p(1
2
− 3α
8
)
￿
in the IC constraint for ti = 1/2
1
2
− 1
2
p(1− α
8
)+ sm− sm(1− p)(12 −
3α
16
) =
= 2b− sm12 p(1−
α
8
)+ sh(
1
2
− (1− p)(1
2
− 3α
16
))
and we obtain
sm =−8−8p+α p8+3α − sh
16−3α−24p+15α p
8+3α
(2.65)
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In the light of step 1 we simplify the objective function (2.58) and maxi-
mize
maxsh,sm {2sm+ sh} . (2.66)
Substituting sm by the RHS of (2.65) we maximize expression
W = const+ sh
48p−24+9α−30α p
8+3α
.
We note that coefficient of sh is positive for any values of parameters α
and p that satisfy condition (2.2). Hence, the maximization ofW requires
maximization of sh. However, the value of sh is bounded by probability
constraints (2.59). We distinguish two cases for values of parameters α
and p.
Let 16(19−
√
265)< α ≤ 1/2 or
0< α ≤ 1
6
(19−√265) ∧ 24−3α
32−16α < p≤ 1, (2.67)
where 16(19−
√
265) ≈ 0.45353. For this range of parameters we set
sh = 1. We calculate sm from (2.65) and we obtain
0< sm =
32p−24+3α−16α p
8+3α
< 1. (2.68)
Let 0 < α ≤ 16(19−
√
265) ∧ 1/2 < p < 24−3α32−16α . For this range of pa-
rameters the maximal value of sh satisfying all constraints of the relaxed
problem is the value corresponding to the minimal value of sm satisfy-
ing the high type IR constraint (2.53). Clearly, the IR constraint requires
sm > 0 and for this range of parameters the corresponding value of sh and,
hence, the value ofW is lower.
We show in subsequence that for parameter values satisfying condition (2.67)
the ex ante probability of peace in the Bayesian equilibrium of the induced
game is lower than the ex ante probability of peace in the non-mediated game.
Let the solution of the initial problem (2.51) be qh = 1,
qm+ pm =
32p−24+3α−16α p
8+3α
and ql +2pl = 1. In this case diads (h,h) and (l, l) do not fight in the Bayesian
equilibrium of the induced game. We can choose the value of x in such a way
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that this solution does not violate the high-type IC constraint and the low type
IR constraint. However, the ex ante probability of peace in the best separating
equilibrium of the mediation game is
Pmed =
1
2
+
32p−24+3α−16α p
2(8+3α)
where inequality
Pmed <Ptalk =
1
2
+
8−16p+4α p−3α
2(8−3α−2α p)
holds for any feasible values of parameters p and α . ￿
We notice that for any feasible parameter values the ex ante probability of
peace in the mediation game is higher than in the case of lack of communication
but lower than the ex ante probability of peace in the peace talk game.
We conclude that in the mediation game where the distribution function over
the set of recommendations is given by (2.50) the best separating equilibrium
does not improve on unmediated communication.
2.4.3 Mediation programme mixing for high types
In this section we consider the mediation programme given by
F(h,h) = (qh, ph, ph,1−qh−2ph), F(h, l) = (qm, pm,0,1−qm− pm),
(2.69)
F(l, l) = (ql,0,0,1−ql).
By symmetry F(l,h) = (qm,0, pm,1− qm− pm). For this type of programmes
the mediator chooses the value of x and probabilities that maximize the proba-
bility of peace
maxx,ql ,qh,qm,pl ,pm
￿
1
4
(qh+2ph)+
1
2
(qm+ pm)+
1
4
ql
￿
, (2.70)
subject to the probability constraints
0≤ ql ≤ 1, 0≤ qm ≤ 1, 0≤ qh ≤ 1, 0≤ qh ≤ 1,0≤ ph ≤ 1, 0≤ pm ≤ 1,
(2.71)
qm+ pm ≤ 1,qh+2ph ≤ 1.
The objective function is also subject to IC and IR constraints that follow.
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A reported high type may receive from the mediator two types of recom-
mendation. Hence, we consider two ex post IR constraints for the high type
share. A high type is offered x with probability ph + pm. After this recom-
mendation he updates his belief about the type of the opponent as Pr[x |m1 =
h] = P[m2 = h| x∧m1 = h] +P[m2 = l | x∧m1 = h]. We require that war is
unprofitable ex post for a reported high type who receives a recommendation x.
Hence, an ex post IR constraint for the high type share states
x(ph+ pm)≥ phπh(ti)+ pm
￿
1
2
− αti
8
￿
(2.72)
for any ti ≥ 1/2. Clearly, inequality (2.72) holds for any ph and pm that satisfy
the probability constraints because x> 1/2 and πh(ti)< 12 by lemma (2).
A high type is offered 1/2 with probability qh+ qm. After this recommen-
dation he updates his belief about the type of the opponent as Pr[1/2 |m1 = h] =
P[m2 = h| 1/2∧m1 = h]+P[m2 = l | 1/2∧m1 = h]. Hence, another ex post IR
constraint for the high type share states
1
2
(qh+qm)≥ qhπh(ti)+qmp
￿
1
2
− αti
8
￿
for any ti ≥ 1/2. Clearly, this inequality holds for any qh and qm which satisfy
the probability constraints because p< 1 and πh(ti)< 12 by lemma (2).
A reported low type may receive from the mediator three types of recom-
mendation. Hence, we consider three ex post IR constraints for the low type
share. A low type is offered 1− x with probability Pr[1− x|m1 = l] = P[m2 =
h| 1− x∧m1 = l] = pm. We require war to be unprofitable ex post for a low
type who receives a recommendation 1−x and beliefs that the message sent by
the opponent is m2 = h. Hence, another ex post IR constraint for the low type
share states
(1− x)≥ (1− p)
￿
1
2
− 3αti
8
￿
for any ti ≤ 1/2. Hence, an ex post IR constraints for the low type share is
(1− x)≥ 1
2
(1− p). (2.73)
A reported low type is offered 1/2 with probability Pr[1/2|m1= l] =P[m2=
h| 1/2∧m1 = l] +P[m2 = l| 1/2∧m1 = l] = qm+ ql . We require that war is
unprofitable ex post for a low type who receives a recommendation 1/2. Hence,
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another ex post IR constraint for the low type share states
1
2
(qm+ql)≥ qm(1− p)
￿
1
2
− 3αti
8
￿
+qlπl(ti)
for any ti ≤ 1/2. This IR constraint is obviously satisfied because πl(ti)< 12 by
lemma (2).
Although the recommendation of the mediator can not be enforced, in the
construction of the interim IC constraints for the mediation game we assume
that misreporting is never followed by a failure to comply with recommenda-
tion. We will check later in the section if the solution of the program provides
some incentive for players to deviate by waging a war after misreporting.
The interim IC constraint for the high type requires inequality
1
2
￿
(1−qh−2ph)πh(ti)+qh12 + phx+ ph(1− x)
￿
+ (2.74)
+
1
2
￿
(1−qm− pm)p
￿
1
2
− αti
8
￿
+qm
1
2
+ pmx
￿
≥
≥ 1
2
((1−qm− pm)πh(ti)+qm12 + pm(1− x))+
1
2
((1−ql)p(12 −
αti
8
)+ql
1
2
)
to be satisfied for all ti ≥ 1/2.
The interim IC constraint for the low type requires inequality
1
2
￿
(1−qm− pm)(1− p)
￿
1
2
− 3αti
8
￿
+qm
1
2
+ pm(1− x)
￿
+ (2.75)
+
1
2
￿
(1−ql)πl(ti)+ql 12
￿
≥
≥ 1
2
￿
(1−qh−2ph)(1− p)
￿
1
2
− 3αti
8
￿
+qh
1
2
+ phx+ ph(1− x)
￿
+
+
1
2
￿
(1−qm− pm)πl(ti)+qm12 + pmx
￿
to be satisfied for all ti ≤ 1/2.
For the sake of convenience we change the parametrisation of the relaxed
program by introducing four variables. We set sh ≡ qh+2ph, sm ≡ qm+ pm and
sl ≡ ql . Additionally, we denote by
b=
1
2
qm+ xpm
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the expected payoff of reported high type in the case of peaceful agreement with
a low type. We note that the expected payoff of reported low type in the case of
peaceful agreement with a high type is
1
2
qm+(1− x)pm = sm−b
and the expected payoff of reported high type in the case of peaceful agreement
with high type is
1
2
qh+ xph+(1− x)ph = 12qh+ ph =
1
2
sh.
We solve the following relaxed problem:
maxb,sl ,sm,sh
￿
1
4
sh+
1
2
sm+
1
4
sl
￿
, (2.76)
subject to the probability constraints
sl ≤ 1, 0≤ sm ≤ 1, 0≤ sh ≤ 1. (2.77)
The interim IR constraint requires that, after learning its own type but before
receiving any recommendation, participation in the mechanism and following
all recommendations is at least as profitable for a player as going to war. The
interim IR constraint for the high type states
1
2
(sh
1
2
+(1− sh)πh(ti))+ 12(b+(1− sm)p(
1
2
− αti
8
))≥ 1
2
πh(ti)+
1
2
p(
1
2
− αti
8
)
for any ti ≥ 1/2, which is equivalent to inequality
sh
￿
1
2
−πh(ti)
￿
+b− smp
￿
1
2
− αti
8
￿
≥ 0 (2.78)
for any ti ≥ 1/2.
The interim IC constraint for the low type states
1
2
￿
1
2
sl +(1− sl)πl(ti)
￿
+
1
2
￿
(sm−b)+(1− sm)(1− p)(12 −
3αti
8
)
￿
≥
1
2
(b+(1− sm)πl(ti))+ 12
￿
sh
1
2
+(1− sh)(1− p)(12 −
3αti
8
)
￿
2.5 Conclusion 51
for any ti ≤ 1/2, which is equivalent to inequality
sl
￿
1
2
−πl(ti)
￿
+ sm− sm(1− p)
￿
1
2
− 3αti
8
￿
≥ (2.79)
2b− smπl(ti)+ sh
￿
1
2
− (1− p)(1
2
− 3αti
8
)
￿
for any ti ≤ 1/2.
Consider the game G induced by the mediation programme (2.50) where
the decision rule satisfies constraints (2.79) and (2.78), probability constraints
(2.77), and solves the problem (2.76).
The following proposition is proved in the Appendix.
Proposition 7 There is an unique best separating equilibrium of the game G
induced by the mediation programme (2.69). The ex ante probability of peace
in this equilibrium does not improve on unmediated communication.
2.5 Conclusion
We studied several mechanisms that maximise the probability of peaceful set-
tlement between two players contesting a prize of common value. The privately
known type of a player describes his strength in a possible conflict. Players hold
a common prior belief about the type of their opponent. We depart from the
benchmark model by allowing for the possibility of uncertain cost of conflict
and continuous types.
We calculated an upper bound for the probability of peaceful split in the
case of lack of communication and a simultaneous choice of players whether to
agree to a given split proposal. We rank sets of Bayesian Nash equilibria that are
achievable in games induced by some information sharing mechanisms. This
Pareto ranking of sets is based on the ex ante probability of peace in the best
separating equilibrium of the induced game.
We study the probability of peace achieved by mechanisms with partial dis-
closure of private information. We allow for some blurring of the boundaries
between partial types. We found that an unmediated cheap talk between players
improves chances for peace for any parameter values, even in the case of par-
tial disclosure. In a conflict resolution environment monetary transfers between
players are not available as a tool to provide incentives for peaceful settlement.
We studied the efficiency of a strategic mediator without enforcement power
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in the case of a mediation game with the same discrete message space as the
unmediated peace talk game. We calculated the probability of peace in the best
separating equilibrium of games induced by two incentive compatible media-
tion programs. One of these mediation programs is characterised by distribution
function F defined as follows
F(h,h) = (qh,0,0,1−qh), F(h, l) = (qm, pm,0,1−qm− pm), (2.80)
F(l, l) = (ql, pl, pl,1−ql−2pl), F(l,h) = (qm,0, pm,1−qm− pm).
In this program the mediator offers with positive probability a higher share of
the prise to one of two low types. The other incentive compatible mediation
program is characterised by distribution function F defined as follows
F(h,h) = (qh, pm, pm,1−qh), F(h, l) = (qm, pm,0,1−qm−2pm), (2.81)
F(l, l) = (ql,0,0,1−ql−2pl), F(l,h) = (qm,0, pm,1−qm−2pm).
In this program the mediator offers with positive probability a higher share of
the prise to one of two high types. We found that these two mediation pro-
grams are not effective in promoting peace. While for some parameter values
each of the mediation programs improves chances for peace upon unmediated
communication, it worsens the probability of peace compared to direct commu-
nication. We found that the ex ante probability of peace in the best separating
equilibria of the two mediation programs is the same. Mediation programs
(2.81) guarantees this maximal ex ante probability of peace for a wider range
of parameter values than the mediation program (2.80). Hence, any linear com-
bination of the two programs will remain incentive compatible but is not likely
to improve chances for peace upon unmediated communication with the same
messages space. This result is consistent with findings presented by Fey and
Ramsay (2010) in [6]. The authors show that for a broad class of crisis bargain-
ing games with no restriction on the motivation of the mediator any equilibrium
outcome that is achievable through mediation is also achievable as an equilib-
rium outcome of an unmediated cheap talk game.
Our analysis does not preclude the possibility for other mediation programmes
with restricted message space to increase the ex ante probability of peace in the
given setup. In order to determine a mediation program which can improve
upon the unmediated communication, a mediation program characterised by
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distribution function
F(h,h) = (qh,0,0,1−qh), F(h, l) = (qm, pm, pm,1−qm−2pm), (2.82)
F(l, l) = (ql,0,0,1−ql−2pl), F(l,h) = (qm, pm, pm,1−qm−2pm),
should also be considered. In this mediation program the mediator does not
always offer the higher share to the high type facing a lower type. If the only
available peaceful mechanism is given by programme (2.82) then it may be op-
timal for the players to share their information with the mediator in spite of im-
perfect alignment of interests. However, if players have opportunity to choose a
mediator they may avoid mediators that offer this mediation program and might
prefer to seek the advice of mediators using programs (2.81) or (2.80).
In our model players are ex ante symmetric. In general, types of players can
be uniformly distributed in different intervals. It is straightforward to extend the
model for the case where the length of the two intervals is the same but players
are recognizable by the lower and upper bound for their type. We model this
case by letting T1 = [0,1] and T2 = [β ,1+β ], where β ∈ (0,1).
A. Meirowitz et al. (2012) show in [13] that mediation might create in-
centives for players to invest in militarization and increase their war capacity.
Hence, the mediator seeking to improve the welfare of the opponents might
face a tradeoff between minimization of destruction caused by a possible con-
flict and minimization of its probability. In this case the decisive information
for a mediator is the value of the prize for the winner in a potential current war.
This is an example of information that an opponent is willing to share with a
strategic mediator but not willing to share with an adversary. The cost αtit j of
potential war in our model can be obtained without revealing types ti and t j of
the opponents. Application of secure function evaluation protocol allows the
mediator to evaluate any function f (ti, t j), for instance tit j, while players keep
private their types. In the frame of our model we could evaluate the recom-
mendation of a mediator that has an access to the partial revelation of private
information.
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Chapter 3
Fair allocation of heterogeneous
objects
with common beliefs about
preferences
3.1 Motivation
The study of mechanisms that allocate one object per agent without mone-
tary transfers is motivated by the examples of children’s placement in public
schools, office or task allocation in institutions, and housing allocation in col-
leges. In these cases there are no monetary compensations available and there
is no possibility for resale.
In many public school admission systems the admissions are decided through
a centralized matching market. In the centralized matching market children’s le-
gal guardians submit their preference information and the market responds with
a matching that optimizes some utility function across all matches. Two com-
monly desired properties of the matching are efficiency and fairness. Matching
is efficient if no other matching gives all children higher utility, under their pref-
erences. One of the most prominent criteria for fairness of matching is lack of
envy. Matching is envy-free if each child considers his allocated school at least
as valuable as other children’s allocation. Admission criteria in many school
admission systems allow for a set of children to score equally on the admission
test. For example, charter schools in the US grant equal chances to students
who reside within the boundaries of a catchment area. Many such schools have
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coarser criteria which do not create strict ordering of students. For instance, stu-
dents with siblings at the school are given higher priority than students without
such siblings but among students with siblings, all students have equal priority.
The problem created by ties is not relevant for each recruitment system. For
instance, the notion of catchment area in the school admissions system in Eng-
land is misleading. According to the study by Burgess et al. (see [3]), "Admis-
sion [to public schools in England] is generally not based on within-district vs
outside-district criteria, but based more on continuous measures such as degree
of proximity and straight line distance". This criteria allows the school admis-
sions system in England to perfectly discriminate between any pair of students
(or rather between the wealth of their parents) on the base of the distance of
their place of residence to the school, measured in terms of feet. The drawback
of this system in which priorities reflect school preferences is a choice restric-
tion for students. Burgess et al. point out in [3] that this problem is particularly
severe for the school admissions system in England. Abdulkadiroglu provides
in [1] a broad discussion of the school admission problem and various school
assignment mechanisms. The author shows that the presence of ties is persis-
tent in the school choice and the question how to break these ties raises some
significant design difficulties.
In a symmetric environment all schools have the same capacity and all stu-
dents tie in priorities at every school. In this case there is no priority ranking of
applicants. For the sake of simplicity, assume that there are as many students
as different public schools and that each school has a capacity of one student.
Students have preferences over schools and do not value money. Indivisible
objects are widely allocated by means of lotteries. Consider a random allo-
cation mechanism that solicits students’ preferences and represents schools as
divisible objects. In this mechanism each student is allocated a lottery that is
a probability distribution over deterministic assignments. Budish et al. (2013)
generalize the theory of random assignments and determine in [2] when ran-
dom assignments that satisfy a structure of constraints can be implemented by
a lottery over deterministic assignments satisfying a given constraints structure.
This theory allows for application of random assignment mechanisms in the
case of group-specific quotas in school choice. Efficiency and fairness are two
normative criteria that a random assignment is expected to meet. An allocation
of lotteries is efficient if no other lottery allocation gives each child a higher ex-
pected utility, under their preferences. A lottery allocation is envy-free if each
student considers his own lottery at least as valuable as other student’s lottery.
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In this case no student wishes to swap the lotteries. The mechanism that assigns
to each student a lottery with equal probability to be allocated to each school
is envy-free but not efficient in the case when some of favourite schools are
different. The random serial dictatorship mechanism is appealing because it
results in efficient allocation but can create justified envy when some children
have similar preferences.
It is not trivial to meet the goal of efficiency because students’ prefer-
ences are unknown to the admission office. We call an assignment mechanism
strategy-proof if a rational student will never find it in his self-interest to falsely
report his own preferences. If the mechanism is not strategy-proof, any ob-
jectives it might achieve will be with respect to potentially false preferences.
We examine in the subsequent paragraphs the existence of efficient, envy-free
and strategy-proof random assignment mechanism for different numbers of stu-
dents that tie in priorities. The existence of such mechanism would help to
promote school admissions systems with discrete criteria within the catchment
area. Such admission systems offer more options to parents and students and
lead to a decrease in social segregation of neighbourhoods.
3.1.1 Two-children ordinal mechanism
Consider a randommechanism that has to allocate two children to public schools
where each school can admit only one child. The mechanism may solicit chil-
dren’s ranking of the two most preferred schools. If the first choices are differ-
ent then each child is assigned his favourite school with probability 1. When
the first choices are the same then each child is allocated to this school with
probability 1/2. In this case each child is allocated to his second best school
with the remaining probability 1/2. Truth telling is a dominant strategy for each
child participating in this mechanism. The resulting assignment of two lotteries
is envy-free and efficient for any von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions
that represent preferences of participants.
3.1.2 Three-children three-school ordinal mechanism
Consider a random mechanism that has to allocate three children to public
schools where each school can admit only one child. The mechanism may
solicit again children’s ordinal preferences which are assumed to be transitive
and complete.
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The efficiency of an ordinal mechanism is defined with respect to the partial
ordering of first order stochastic dominance. Katta and Sethuraman provide an
example in [8] showing that any efficient and envy-free ordinal mechanism is
not strategy-proof in the full preference domain. For the sake of completeness
we present the example given in [8]. Denote the set of schools by (a,b,c) and
the set of children by (1,2,3) where the preference profile is given by Table
(3.1).
Table 3.1 Preference orderings
Child
1 {a,b} c
2 a b c
3 a c b
The ordinally efficient and envy-free probabilistic assignment for this pro-
file is unique and is the one shown in Table (3.2).
Table 3.2 Probabilistic assignment
Child a b c
1 0 3/4 1/4
2 1/2 1/4 1/4
3 1/2 0 1/2
Assume that child 1 falsely reports preference ordering {a,b,c}. The only
ordinally efficient and envy-free probabilistic assignment for this profile is unique
and is the one shown in Table (3.3).
Table 3.3 Probabilistic assignment
Child a b c
1 1/3 1/2 1/6
2 1/3 1/2 1/6
3 1/3 0 2/3
Lottery (1/3,1/2,1/6) assigned to child 1 in the probabilistic assignment
in Table (3.3) first order stochastically dominates lottery (0,3/4,1/4) assigned
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to child 1 in the probabilistic assignment in Table (3.2). Hence, the ordinal
mechanism that finds ordinally efficient and envy-free probabilistic assignments
is not dominant strategy incentive compatible where we allow for indifference
between alternatives. Although the assumption of strict preferences is useful in
many applications, in some everyday cases, we do not have, and do not need,
strict preferences.
3.1.3 The role of beliefs in the school admission process
In any school admission system the favourite schools are rarely the ones that
children actually nominate in their preference lists. Once the admission crite-
ria are set by the local or school authority, parents form well defined expec-
tations about their neighbours’ school preferences and about schools that will
be oversubscribed. At the time when applications are made, highly desirable
schools with small catchment areas or expected oversubscription can be ex-
cluded from the choice set. Conversely, some parents might be almost certain
that they will be offered a place because there are no much candidates living
in the close proximity of the school. The school choice of parents is affected
not only by the admission criteria (or the mechanism design) used by schools
and local authorities in their area but also by the common beliefs about rela-
tive popularity of schools. Parents’ awareness of the restricted access to the
more popular schools determines to a great extent "truthfulness" of preferences
reported to the mechanism. This makes Bayesian implementation particularly
relevant. The environment justifies our requirement for the assignment mech-
anism to be incentive compatible with respect to commonly held beliefs about
the joint distribution of peers’ preferences.
3.2 The cardinal assignment mechanism
Consider an economy with a set of indivisible objects in which each agent can
be allocated exactly one object. Cardinal utilities of agents are private infor-
mation that are drawn from a commonly known distribution. We study the
possibility for a mechanism that solicits cardinal information in agents’ prefer-
ences to improve over allocation mechanisms that utilize only agents’ ordinal
preferences. We consider a deterministic mechanism that allows agents to re-
port for each object a limited number of preference intensities. Types of agents
are finite and multidimensional. We assume that there is a common knowledge
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among the agents of a common prior over the preference profiles. A mechanism
designer wishes to implement a probabilistic assignment for each realisation of
type profiles. We consider the revelation game with incomplete information in-
duced by the mechanism. The strategy proof requirement for the mechanism is
relaxed to the requirement of Bayesian incentive compatibility. For any given
preference profile and system of beliefs, the mechanism is evaluated by em-
ploying the concepts of ex post incentive efficiency and ex post envy-freeness.
3.2.1 Information structure
Let I = {1,2, ...,n} be the set of agents and J the collection of objects, where
|J| = n. During the ex ante stage each agent privately observes n-dimensional
von Neumann-Morgenstern utility index for the set of objects. We assume that
individual preference relations can produce multiple minimal and maximal ele-
ments for the set of alternatives. We restrict the domain of preferences by fixing
the minimal difference in utility level of alternatives. We use the finite utility
grid model employed by Dutta, Peters and Sen in [5]. In particular, we allow
for three distinct utility levels: 0, some η > 0, and 1−η > 0, where η ∈ (0,1)
is chosen by the mechanism designer. The utility of agent i from receiving
object j is denoted by vi( j) and restricted to the domain {0,η ,1}. An admissi-
ble von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function for agent i is vi : J→ {0,η ,1}
where there exists at least one element j ∈ J such that vi( j) = 1 and at least
one element j￿ ∈ J such that vi( j￿) = 0. Denote vi j = vi( j). Let Ti be the set
of admissible vectors of utility valuations (vi1, ...,vin), |Ti|= 3n−2n(n−1). The
private signal of agent i is a vector ti = (vi1, ...,vin) ∈ Ti that will be referred to
as agent’s type. The type space Ti has a natural partial order that we denote by
￿i. This order is the product order defined by
ti ￿i t ￿i ⇐⇒ tih ≤ t ￿ih,∀h= 1, ...,n.
Define ti ≺i t ￿i by ti ￿i t ￿i and ti ￿= t ￿i .
Types of agents other than i are denoted by T−i where T−i ∈ T−i ≡× j ￿=iTi.
Let T denotes a full type profile where T ∈T ≡×i∈ITi.
Information is incomplete. Prior beliefs of agents about the distribution of
preferences in the population are represented by cumulative distribution func-
tion F : T → [0,1]. The joint distribution of types F is commonly known. We
allow the valuation vectors for agents to be arbitrarily correlated among agents
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and among objects. Denote by Fi the marginal cumulative distribution of types
for each agent i. It is assumed that function Fi : Ti → [0,1] has positive prob-
ability mass function fi on the support Ti. Denote by p−i(.|ti) the conditional
probability on T−i given ti. Probability function p−i(.|ti) will be referred to as
the posterior belief of type ti of agent i about the distribution of others’ types.
3.2.2 The allocation mechanism
A feasible assignment matrix X ∈X is a bistochastic matrix where xi j is the
objective probability of agent i receiving object j. We denote by xi the vector
of probability shares for agent i in the matrix X .
A pure assignment a is given by a permutation matrix [ai j] such that
∀ j ∈ J
m
∑
i=1
ai j = 1, ∀i ∈ I
n
∑
j=1
ai j = 1 and ai j ∈ {0,1}. (3.1)
The Birkhoff-von Neumann Theorem (1946,1953) shows that any bistochastic
matrix is a convex combination of permutation matrices. This theorem implies
that, in the case where the number of agents equals the number of objects and
agents have unit demand, any feasible assignment is implementable as a lottery
over the set of pure assignments.
By revelation principle (see e.g. Myerson [12]), there is no loss of gener-
ality in restricting our attention to direct mechanisms. A mechanism designer
wishes to allocate the objects for each realization of type profiles. Agents are
asked to declare a type and the profile of declared types determines the as-
signment matrix. The revelation mechanism is denoted by Γ = ({Ti},φ). The
objective is represented by function φ : T →X that takes as input a profile
of declared types and returns an assignment matrix in the set X . Let the out-
come be φ(T ) = X . We adopt a notation where φi(T ) is the lottery xi for agent
i selected by the rule φ for the type profile T , and φi j(T ) = xi j denotes the
probability share for allocation of object j in this lottery.
The expected utility for type ti of agent i from assignment X is the inner
product ui(X , ti) = xi · ti. We assume that a mechanism designer knows the joint
distribution of types F and uses this probability measures to evaluate expected
utility of different types of agents.
Denote by ∆Ti the probability distribution on the set Ti. A strategy for agent
i in a direct mechanism is a mapping ψ : Ti→ ∆Ti. Truth telling corresponds to
the identity matrix I|Ti|.
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The ex post utility from the rule φ for agent i of type ti when the type profile
is T is
Ui(φ(T ), ti) = ti ·φi(T ).
The interim expected assignment to agent i if he reports type si, assuming
all other agents truthfully report their type, is defined by
φˆi(φ |si) = ∑
T−i∈T−i
p−i(T−i|ti) φi(T−i,si).
Denote by Ui(φ |ti,si) the interim expected utility to type ti of agent i if he
reports type si, assuming all other agents truthfully report their type, i.e.
Ui(φ |ti,si) = ti · φˆi(φ |si). (3.2)
DenoteUi(φ |ti) =Ui(φ |ti, ti) the interim expected utility of agent i from a truth-
ful report.
The Bayesian incentive compatibility requires that reporting the true type
be a Bayesian equilibrium of the revelation game induced by Γ.
Definition 5 A direct mechanism Γ is (interim) Bayesian incentive compatible
for the joint distribution of valuation profiles F if for all types ti of agent i and
reports si
Ui(φ |ti)≥Ui(φ |ti,si), f or ∀i. (3.3)
We consider the set of incentive compatible mechanisms with the messages
space Ti for each agent. We will define below the criteria that can be applied un-
der asymmetric information to select a socially desirable mechanism from this
set. Ex post refers to the stage at which each agent knows his own preferences
and knows other agents’ reports.
Definition 6 A direct mechanism Γ is ex post incentive efficient for the joint
distribution of valuation profiles F if it is incentive compatible and there is no
incentive compatible direct mechanisms with assignment rule φ ￿ such that for
all i ∈ I and all T ∈T
ti ·φ ￿i (T )≥ ti ·φi(T )
with at least one strict inequality.
Interim refers to the stage at which each agent knows his own preferences
and knows how other agents’ preferences are distributed only. We consider the
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situation when the mechanism is selected at the interim stage. The selection
criteria in this case is captured by the notion of interim incentive efficiency
introduced by Holmstrom and Myerson (1983).
Definition 7 A direct mechanism Γ is interim efficient for the joint distribution
of valuation profiles F if it is incentive compatible and there is no other mech-
anism Γ￿ with assignment rule φ ￿ such that (a) Γ￿ is incentive compatible and
(b) Ui(φ ￿|ti, ti) ≥Ui(φ |ti, ti) for all i, ti and Ui(φ ￿|tk, tk) >Ui(φ |tk, tk) for some
agent i of type tk.
Definition 8 A direct mechanism Γ is ex post envy free for the joint distribution
of valuation profiles F if for all i, j and all type profiles T
ti ·φi(T )≥ ti ·φ j(T ).
Definition 9 A direct mechanism Γ is interim envy free for the joint distribution
of valuation profiles F if for all i, j
ti · φˆi(φ |ti)≥ ti · φˆ j(φ |ti). (3.4)
It is easy to show that any ex post envy free mechanism is interim envy free. The
set of ex post envy free mechanisms is a proper subset of the set of interim envy
free mechanisms. An interim envy free allocations may not be ex post envy free
because inequality (3.4) involving linear combinations of utilities ti ·φi(T−i,si)
does not imply any relationship between components.
We consider two different concepts of monotonicity describing properties
of allocation mechanisms that are studied in the following paragraphs.
Definition 10 A direct mechanism Γ is non decreasing in each report for the
joint distribution of valuation profiles F if for any type t of agent i, any j ∈ J,
and any pair of reports ti, t ￿i ∈ Ti such that t ￿il = til for l ￿= j and ti j > t ￿i j the
assignment rule φ satisfies condition
φˆi j(φ |ti)≥ φˆi j(φ |t ￿i). (3.5)
Definition 11 A direct mechanism Γ is swap monotone on the set T if the
allocation probabilities have the same order as the reports of the agents, i.e.,
for all T ∈T , i,k ∈ I, j ∈ J and ti j > tk j the assignment rule φ satisfies
φi j(T )≥ φk j(T ).
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The mechanism is said to be individually rational if it is weakly preferred
by each agent to the consequences of non-participation. We do not investi-
gate separately the individual rationality of the assignment mechanism. Fol-
lowing the treatment of individual rationality by Crawford in [4], we assume
that all assignment mechanisms allow each agent to choose unilaterally to non-
participate. Under this assumption, the effect of the unilateral ex ante decision
not to participate and the interim decision not to report truthfully is equiva-
lent. Hence, the incentive compatibility property of the mechanism implies the
voluntary participation.
3.3 Necessary condition for interim incentive com-
patibility
We provide necessary condition for Bayesian incentive compatibility of mech-
anism Γ.
Proposition 8 A direct mechanism Γ is Bayesian incentive compatible if it is
non decreasing in each argument on the set T .
Proof: To prove necessity, we show that (i) is property of any mechanism Γ
satisfying Bayesian incentive compatibility. Let Γ be Bayesian incentive com-
patible mechanism. Consider any two admissible reports ti and t ￿i for agent i
such that t ￿il = til for l ￿= j and ti j > t ￿i j. Since Γ is incentive compatible, agent i
has no incentive to misreport, i.e.
ti · ∑
T−i∈T−i
p−i(T−i|ti) φi(T−i, ti)≥ ti · ∑
T−i∈T−i
p−i(T−i|ti) φi(T−i, t ￿i) (3.6)
and
t ￿i · ∑
T−i∈T−i
p−i(T−i|t ￿i) φi(T−i, t ￿i)≥ t ￿i · ∑
T−i∈T−i
p−i(T−i|t ￿i) φi(T−i, ti). (3.7)
Adding terms in each side of inequalities (3.6) and (3.7) yields
(ti− t ￿i) · ∑
T−i∈T−i
(p−i(T−i|ti)φi(T−i, ti)− p−i(T−i|t ￿i)φi(T−i, t ￿i))≥ 0. (3.8)
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Taking into account that ti− t ￿i = (0, ..., ti j− t ￿i j, ...0) yields
(ti j− t ￿i j) · ∑
T−i∈T−i
(p−i(T−i|ti)φi j(T−i, ti)− p−i(T−i|t ￿i)φi j(T−i, t ￿i))≥ 0. (3.9)
As ti j− t ￿i j > 0 inequality (3.9) is equivalent to
∑
T−i∈T−i
p−i(T−i|ti) φi j(T−i, ti)≥ ∑
T−i∈T−i
p−i(T−i|t ￿i) φi j(T−i, t ￿i). (3.10)
Therefore, ∑T−i∈T−i p−i(T−i|ti) φi(T−i, .) is a non decreasing function in each
argument.
￿
Corollary 1.1: If a direct mechanism Γ is Bayesian incentive compatible
then for any agent i ∈ I and any two ordered types t ￿i ￿i ti
Ui(φ |t ￿i)≤Ui(φ |ti). (3.11)
Proof: Let Γ be Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism. Then Γ is non
decreasing in each argument on the set T and inequality (3.8) is satisfied. Con-
sider any two agents of types t ￿i ￿i ti. By inequality (3.8) we obtain
(ti− t ￿i) · ∑
T−i∈T−i
p−i(T−i|t ￿i) φi(T−i, t ￿i)≤ (ti− t ￿i) · ∑
T−i∈T−i
p−i(T−i|ti) φi(T−i, ti).
(3.12)
Taking into account inequalities (3.6) and (3.7) we obtain
(ti− t ￿i) · ∑
T−i∈T−i
p−i(T−i|t ￿i) φi(T−i, t ￿i)≤ (3.13)
≤Ui(φ |ti)−Ui(φ |t ￿i)≤
(ti− t ￿i) · ∑
T−i∈T−i
p−i(T−i|ti) φi(T−i, ti).
All coordinates of the expected assignment vectors φˆi(T−i, t ￿i) and φˆi(T−i, ti) are
non negative. All coordinates of the vector ti− t ￿i have the same sign. Hence,
inequality (3.13) implies that the expected utilityUi(φ |ti) is non decreasing on
T in each argument of the true type ti. Inequality (3.13) holds for arbitrary
ordered types ti and t ￿i , which establishes (3.11).
￿
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3.4 The n=3 case
3.4.1 Characterization of interim incentive compatible mech-
anisms
We provide necessary and sufficient condition for Bayesian incentive compati-
bility of mechanism Γ for n= 3.
Proposition 9 A direct mechanism Γ is Bayesian incentive compatible iff
(i) is non decreasing in each argument on the set T ;
(ii) for any agent i and any pair of reports ti, t ￿i ∈ Ti, such that ti j = t ￿i j = 1
φˆi j(T−i, ti) = φˆi j(T−i, t ￿i);
(iii) for any agent i, any pair of reports ti, t ￿i ∈ Ti, and any three different
objects j,k, l ∈ {1,2,3}, inequalities
ti j ≥ t ￿ik ∧ tik ≤ t ￿i j ∧ til = t ￿il = 0,
imply
φˆi j(T−i, ti)≥ φˆik(T−i, t ￿i) and φˆik(T−i, ti)≤ φˆi j(T−i, t ￿i).
Proof: Sufficiency is proved first. Consider a direct mechanism Γ that sat-
isfies (i) and (ii). For any agent i ∈ I and any two ordered types ti, t ￿i ∈ Ti the
coordinates of vector (ti− t ￿i) have the same sign. Then the expected assign-
ments φˆi(T−i, ti) and φˆi(T−i, t ￿i) satisfy
(ti− t ￿i) · (φˆi(T−i, ti)− φˆi(T−i, t ￿i))≥ 0. (3.14)
By adding (ti− t ￿i)φˆi(T−i, t ￿i) to both sides of (3.14) we obtain
(ti−t ￿i) ·(φˆi(T−i, ti)− φˆi(T−i, t ￿i)+(ti−t ￿i)φˆi(T−i, t ￿i)≥ (ti−t ￿i)φˆi(T−i, t ￿i). (3.15)
Rearranging terms on both sides of (3.15) yields
ti · (φˆi(T−i, ti)− φˆi(T−i, t ￿i))+ t ￿i · (φˆi(T−i, t ￿i)− φˆi(T−i, ti))≥ 0. (3.16)
Since types ti and t ￿i are arbitrary, both terms in the left side of (3.16) are non
negative. Hence,
ti · φˆi(T−i, ti)≥ ti · φˆi(T−i, t ￿i)
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and
t ￿i · φˆi(T−i, t ￿i)≥ t ￿i · φˆi(T−i, ti),
which establishes the incentive compatibility of Γ for ordered types.
Let types ti, t ￿i ∈ Ti be not ordered. Denote by ek the unit vector in R3 such
that ekk = 1. Clearly, ek ∈ Ti for any k. There exists j ∈ J such that ti j = 1
and there exists h ∈ J such that t ￿ih = 1. Let j = h. Without loss of generality,
let j = h = 2 and ti3 = ti1 = 0. Consider ti = (x,1,0) and t ￿i = (0,1,y) where
x,y ∈ {η ,1}. Types e2 = (0,1,0) and t ￿i are ordered. Hence,
(0,1,y)φˆi(T−i,(0,1,y))≥ (0,1,y)φˆi(T−i,(0,1,0)).
Condition (ii) yields φˆi2(T−i,(0,1,0)) = φˆi2(T−i,(x,1,0)). Condition (i) yields
φˆi1(T−i,(0,1,0)) ≤ φˆi1(T−i,(x,1,0)). Taking into account that the sum of in-
terim expected shares is equal to one yields
φˆi3(T−i,(0,1,0))≥ φˆi3(T−i,(x,1,0)).
Hence,
(0,1,y)φˆi(T−i,(0,1,0))≥ (0,1,η)φˆi(T−i,(x,1,0)).
Therefore,
(0,1,y)φˆi(T−i,(0,1,y))≥ (0,1,y)φˆi(T−i,(x,1,0)).
Similarly, we notice that
(x,1,0)φˆi(T−i,(x,1,0))≥ (x,1,0)φˆi(T−i,e2)
because types e2 and ti are ordered. Condition (ii) yields
φˆi2(T−i,e2) = φˆi(T−i,(0,1,y)).
By condition (i) φˆi3(T−i,e2)≤ φˆi3(T−i,(0,1,y)). Hence,
φˆi1(T−i,e2)≥ φˆi1(T−i,(0,1,y)).
Therefore,
(x,1,0)φˆi(T−i,e2)≥ (x,1,0)φˆi(T−i,(0,1,y)).
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Hence, we obtain
(x,1,0)φˆi(T−i,(x,1,0))≥ (x,1,0)φˆi(T−i,(0,1,η))
which establishes that Γ is Bayesian incentive compatible for non ordered types
where there exists an object for which both types’ value is 1.
Let the non ordered types ti, t ￿i ∈ Ti be such that ti j = 1 and t ￿ih = 1 but j ￿= h.
Without loss of generality, let ti1 = 1 and t ￿i3 = 1. Then ti = (1,0,x) and t ￿i =
(y,0,1) where x,y ∈ {0,η}. Let x= y. Condition (iii) yields
φˆi1(T−i,(1,0,x))= φˆi1(T−i,(x,0,1)) and φˆi3(T−i,(1,0,x))= φˆi3(T−i,(x,0,1)).
Hence,
(1,0,x)φˆi(T−i,(1,0,x)) = (1,0,x)φˆi(T−i,(x,0,1))
and
(x,0,1)φˆi(T−i,(x,0,1)) = (x,0,1)φˆi(T−i,(1,0,x)).
Let x ￿= y. Without loss of generality, let x= 0 and y= η . Condition (iii) yields
φˆi1(T−i,(1,0,0))≥ φˆi1(T−i,(η ,0,1))
and
φˆi3(T−i,(1,0,0))≤ φˆi3(T−i,(η ,0,1)).
Hence,
(1,0,0)φˆi(T−i,(1,0,0))≥ (1,0,0)φˆi(T−i,(η ,0,1)).
Condition (iii) yields also
(η ,0,1)φˆi(T−i,(η ,0,1)) = (η ,0,1)φˆi(T−i,(1,0,η)),
Taking into account that by condition (ii)
φˆi1(T−i,(1,0,0)) = φˆi1(T−i,(1,0,η))
and by condition (i)
φˆi3(T−i,(1,0,0))≤ φˆi3(T−i,(1,0,η)),
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we obtain
(η ,0,1)φˆi(T−i,(1,0,η))≥ (η ,0,1)φˆi(T−i,(1,0,0)).
Therefore,
(η ,0,1)φˆi1(T−i,(η ,0,0))≥ (η ,0,1)φˆi1(T−i,(1,0,0))
which establishes the Bayesian incentive compatibility of Γ in the case of non
ordered types where there does not exist any object for which both types’ value
is 1.
The necessity of (i) is proved by Proposition (8). To prove necessity of (ii)
and (iii), we show that (ii) and (iii) are properties of any Bayesian incentive
compatible mechanism Γ. Let Γ be Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism.
Without loss of generality, assume that for some agent i and some pair of reports
ti = (0,1,0), t ￿i = (x,1,0), where x ∈ {0,η}, but
φˆi j(T−i, ti)< φˆi j(T−i, t ￿i).
Then tiφˆi j(T−i, ti) < tiφˆi j(T−i, t ￿i), which contradicts the incentive compatibility
of Γ. This establishes that Γ satisfies (ii). To prove necessity of (iii), consider
any pair of reports ti, t ￿i ∈ Ti such that for some different objects j,k, l ∈ {1,2,3},
inequalities
ti j ≥ t ￿ik∧ tik ≤ t ￿i j∧ til = t ￿il = 0
hold. Without loss of generality, let ti = (1,0,η) and t ￿i = (η ,0,1). Since Γ
satisfies Bayesian incentive compatibility,
φˆi1(T−i, ti)+ηφˆi3(T−i, ti)≥ φˆi1(T−i, t ￿i)+ηφˆi3(T−i, t ￿i)
and
ηφˆi1(T−i, t ￿i)+ φˆi3(T−i, t ￿i)≥ ηφˆi1(T−i, ti)+ φˆi3(T−i, ti).
By rearranging terms in both inequalities, we obtain
φˆi1(T−i, ti)− φˆi1(T−i, t ￿i)≥ η(φˆi3(T−i, t ￿i)− φˆi3(T−i, ti))
and
φˆi3(T−i, t ￿i)− φˆi3(T−i, ti)≥ η(φˆi1(T−i, ti)− φˆi1(T−i, t ￿i)).
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Let u = φˆi1(T−i, ti)− φˆi1(T−i, t ￿i) and v = φˆi3(T−i, t ￿i)− φˆi3(T−i, ti). The system
of inequalities
u≥ ηv and v≥ ηu
where 0< η < 1 is satisfied if and only if u> 0 and v> 0 or u= v= 0. Hence,
φˆi1(T−i, ti)≥ φˆi1(T−i, t ￿i) and φˆi3(T−i, t ￿i)≥ φˆi3(T−i, ti) which establishes (iii).
￿
3.4.2 Other necessary conditions for interim incentive com-
patibility
The following two conditions on the interim utility of types are necessary for
the Bayesian incentive compatibility of the mechanism Γ.
Denote by ||t|| the Euclidean norm of vector t.
Corollary 2.1: A necessary condition for the incentive compatibility of a
direct mechanism Γ is the following: for any agent i ∈ I and any two types
ti, t ￿i ∈ Ti, such that ||ti|| = ||t ￿i || > 1 and til = t ￿il = 0 for some l ∈ J, the interim
expected utility is the same, i.e.
Ui(φ |t ￿i) =Ui(φ |ti).
Proof: Let mechanism Γ be Bayesian incentive compatible. Let types t ￿i , ti
of agent i be such that ||ti|| = ||t ￿i || > 1 and til = t ￿il = 0. Since types t ￿i , ti are
feasible, there exists three different objects j,k, l ∈ {1,2,3}, such that
ti j = t ￿ik∧ tik = t ￿i j∧ til = t ￿il = 0
and ti j > 0, tik > 0. By condition (iii) in Proposition 2
φˆi j(T−i, ti) = φˆik(T−i, t ￿i) and φˆik(T−i, ti) = φˆi j(T−i, t ￿i).
Therefore, the interim expected utility of types ti and t ￿i satisfy
Ui(φ |ti)= ti jφˆi j(T−i, ti)+tikφˆik(T−i, ti)= t ￿ikφˆik(T−i, t ￿i)+t ￿i jφˆi j(T−i, t ￿i)=Ui(φ |t ￿i)
which completes the proof. ￿
The next constraint represents the interim utility of a type in terms of the
expected value of that type’s allocation, given that all agents report truthfully.
In the case of one dimensional continuous types model where the utility func-
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tion is continuously differentiable in types, the continuous types form of this
constraint is a part of the two conditions that completely characterize the in-
centive compatible mechanisms (see e.g. [10] by Ledyard and Palfrey (2007)).
In our model with discrete, three dimensional types, this constraint is satisfied
"locally" for any subset of ordered types.
Corollary 2.2: A necessary condition for Bayesian incentive compatibility
of a direct mechanism Γ is the following: for any agent i∈ I and any type ti ∈ Ti
(i)
Ui(φ |ti) =Ui(φ |t0i )+(ti− t0i )φˆi(T−i, ti)
where ||t0||= 1 and t0 ￿i ti.
Proof: Let Γ be a Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism. Consider
types ti, t0i ∈ Ti of agent i such that ||t0||= 1 and t0 ￿i ti. Let ti j = t0i j = 1. Since
Γ is Bayesian incentive compatible, condition (ii) in Proposition 2 is satisfied.
Hence,
φˆi j(T−i, ti) = φˆi j(T−i, t ￿i).
Without loss of generality, let j = 1, i.e. t0i = (1,0,0), and let ti3 = t
￿
i3 = 0.
Taking into account that φˆi1(T−i, ti) = φˆi1(T−i, t0i ) and ti− t0i = (0, ti2,0), we
obtain
ti1φˆi1(T−i, ti)+ ti2φˆi2(T−i, ti) = t0i1φˆi1(T−i, t0i )+ ti2φˆi2(T−i, ti)
which establishes (i). ￿
3.5 Incentive efficient mechanisms
In the context of general collective choice problem the theorem by Myerson
(1983) (see [13]) characterizes the set of interim efficient mechanisms as so-
lutions to a constrained welfare optimisation problem. In this context the con-
straint guarantees that the expected utility of any agent is a non decreasing
function of agent’s type.
Denote by λ the set of type dependent interim utility weights {λi : Ti →
R+}i∈I and by λ 0i =∑ti∈Ti fi(ti)λi(ti) the agent i’s ex ante welfare weight relative
to other agents. We state the following result without proof.
Theorem: A direct mechanism Γ is interim efficient if and only if there
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exists a set of utility weights λ , where λ 0i > 0 for some i, such that Γmaximises
∑
i∈I
∑
ti∈Ti
λi(ti) fi(ti)Ui(φ , ti)
subject to Γ is Bayesian incentive compatible.
Conditions under which the solution of the relaxed optimization problem
satisfies the missing constraint is known as the regular case. In some envi-
ronments sufficient conditions for regularity can be established. For example,
Ledyard and Palfrey (2007) provide in [10]) sufficient conditions for regularity
for independent linear environments.
Consider the solution of the relaxed optimisation problem
maxλ∑
i∈I
∑
ti∈Ti
λi(ti) fi(ti)Ui(φ , ti). (3.17)
Since types are independent, the relaxed optimisation problem can be solved
in two steps (a linear utility example is provided by Wilson (1992) in [16]). In
the first step we optimise group’s sum of interim utilities for three groups of
types. Each group consists of ordered types comparable with one of the feasible
types with norm 1: (1,0,0),(0,1,0),(0,0,1). Clearly, these groups correspond
to overlapping sets with common types (1,1,0),(0,1,1),(1,0,1). The weight
of a group’s sum of expected utilities in the total sum is obtained by assigning
uniform constant welfare weights, e.g. 1, for each member of the group. In the
second step we optimise the sum of interim utilities within each group.
The following claim is proved in Appendix B.
Proposition 10 Let Γ be Bayesian incentive compatible. Let λ be the optimal
set of type dependent interim utility weights for the optimization problem (3.17).
Then for any agent i and any types t ￿￿i ￿i ti ￿i t ￿i , the optimal weights’ products
{wi(ti)}ti∈Ti = {λi(ti) fi(ti)}ti∈Ti satisfy
wi(t ￿￿i )≤ wi(ti)≤ wi(t ￿i).
Holmstrom and Myerson (1983) show that interim efficient mechanisms
are also ex post incentive efficient. In the next paragraphs we consider ex post
incentive efficient mechanisms.
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3.6 Ex post incentive efficient and envy-free mech-
anisms
We consider the existence of ex post incentive efficient and ex post envy-free
direct mechanism Γ. We limit our consideration to the class of deterministic
mechanisms. The conditions determining ex post efficient and ex post envy
free assignment for some type profile are independent of the probability dis-
tribution of types. In contrast, the incentive compatibility constraint is defined
with respect to some particular distribution of type profiles F . The set of ex
post efficient and envy free assignment rules is not finite although the set of
type profiles is finite. In this paragraph we provide examples of type profiles
for which there are infinitely many ex post efficient and envy free assignments.
There is a lower and upper bound for the utility of each type in any of these as-
signments. Hence, we expect that for any assignment rule, that is deterministic
for each type profile, there exist some distribution of type profiles for which the
rule is not incentive compatible.
Recall that any ex post envy-free mechanism is interim envy-free. Let us
consider two agents that have the same preferences. Since our mechanism does
not create any justified envy, such agents should receive assignments that they
deem equivalent. Clearly, an interim envy-free assignment rule satisfies a weak
form of anonymity: an equal treatment of equals. It means that ties are resolved
by providing the same assignment for any two agents that submit the same
report. For every type profile T denote by T i j the type profile obtained from T
by exchanging agent i’s and agent j’s reports.
Definition 12 A direct mechanism Γ is (weakly) anonymous if for any agents i
and j and any type profile T ∈T , φi(T i j) = φ j(T ).
We note that this is a weak version of anonymity because we do not permute
all agents and we do not require that the assignments of other agents remain the
same.
3.6.1 Sets of ex post efficient and envy-free assignments
On the full preference domain the ex post ordinal efficient and envy-free as-
signment is unique for each preference profile (see [8] by Katta and Sethuraman
(2006)). The following examples show that for some cardinal type profiles from
the setT there exist infinitely many ex post efficient and envy free assignments.
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Katta and Sethuraman show in [8] that probabilistic serial mechanism is not
strategy-proof on the full preference domain by using an example of two par-
ticular preference profiles. The ordinally efficient and envy-free allocations for
these profiles are uniquely determined. First, we calculate the sets of ex post ef-
ficient and envy free assignments for two cardinal type profiles that correspond
to the preference profiles considered by Katta and Sethuraman. We show that
the type of agent for which the ordinal ex post efficient and envy free mecha-
nism is not strategy-proof, has no incentive to misreport in an ex post efficient
and envy free mechanism Γ.
For the sake of convenience in the subsequent paragraphs we denote the set
of objects by (a,b,c). Let the type profile T be given by Table (3.4).
Table 3.4 Valuations
Agent a b c
1 1 1 0
2 1 η 0
3 1 0 η
Ex post efficiency implies that at least one of the shares x1b and x2b is posi-
tive. Then if x3b > 0 there exists a Pareto improving trade between agent 3 and
agents 1 or 2. Hence, the efficiency of assignment X implies x3b = 0.
If x1a > 0 then x1b < 1. Hence, x2b > 0.Then there exists a Pareto improving
trade between agents 1 and 2: agent 1 can give up part of his share x1a to agent
2 in exchange to equal part of his share x2b. Hence, efficiency implies x1a = 0.
Then the structure of ex post efficient assignment X is
X =
 0 x1b 1− x1bx2a 1− x1b x1b− x2a
1− x2a 0 x2a

where x1b and x2a satisfy the following envy free conditions.
Agent 2 will not envy agent 1 if
ηx1b ≤ x2a+η(1− x1b) ⇐⇒ 2ηx1b ≤ x2a+η .
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Similarly, agent 1 will not envy agent 2 if
x1b ≥ x2a+(1− x1b) ⇐⇒ 2x1b ≥ 1+ x2a.
Hence, 1/2 < x1b ≤ 1. The following condition guarantees that agent 3 does
not envy agent 2
1− x2a+ηx2a ≥ x2a+η(x1b− x2a) ⇐⇒ 1−ηx1b ≥ 2(1−η)x2a.
Agent 2 will not envy agent 3 if
x2a+η(1− x1b)≥ 1− x2a ⇐⇒ 2x2a ≥ 1−η+ηx1b.
Agent 1 will not envy agent 3 if
1≤ x1b+ x2a.
The subset of assignments that correspond to ex post efficient and envy free
assignments for the type profile given in Table (3.4) is not convex for each value
of the grid parameter η . This subset is shown on Figure (3.1).
Fig. 3.1 The set of ex post efficient and envy free assignments for the type
profile given in Table (3.4)
For example, it is easy to check that this subset is not convex for η = 9/10.
For η = 1/2 the set of ex post efficient and envy free assignments for the type
profile given in Table (3.4) is convex. This set has three extreme points given
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by pairs of values (13/28,6/7), (4/7,6/7), and (1/2,1) for x2a and x1b:
X1 =
 0 1 01/2 0 1/2
1/2 0 1/2
 ,
X2 =
 0 6/7 1/713/28 4/28 11/28
15/28 0 13/28
 ,
X3 =
 0 6/7 1/74/7 1/7 2/7
3/7 0 4/7
 .
Next, we calculate the assignment for agent 1 with report t ￿1 = (1,η ,0) for
the type profile T given in Table (3.5).
Table 3.5 Valuations
Agent a b c
1 1 η 0
2 1 η 0
3 1 0 η
Assume that x3b> 0. Then x3c< 1. It implies that at least one of inequalities
x2c > 0 and x1c > 0 is satisfied. Hence, there exists a Pareto improving trade
between agent 3 and agents 2 or 1. Therefore, a necessary condition for ex post
efficiency of the assignment for type profile in Table (3.5) is x3b = 0. Agents 1
and 2 do not envy each other if
x1a+ηx1b = x2a+ηx2b.
It is easy to show that in an ex post efficient and envy free assignment agents 1
and 2 with identical reports may receive different assignments vectors (u,v,1−
u− v) and (u+η(2v− 1),1− v,v+η − u− 2vη), where x1a = u and x1b =
v, with equal probability. However, by assumption mechanism Γ satisfies the
equal treatment of equals property. Hence, we set x1a = x2a and x1b = x2b.
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Therefore, the structure of assignment matrix X is the following:
X =
 x1a 1/2 1/2− x1ax1a 1/2 1/2− x1a
1−2x1a 0 2x1a
 . (3.18)
Agents 1 and 3 do not envy each other if and only if
x1a+η
1
2
≥ 1−2x1a
and
1−2x1a+2ηx1a ≥ x1a.
Hence, the assignment matrix (3.18) corresponds to an efficient and envy free
assignment if
2−η
6
≤ x1a ≤ 13−2η .
Therefore, the set of efficient and envy free assignments for type profile (3.5) is
convex for any value of η . In particular, for η = 1/2 the assignment (3.18) is
efficient and envy free for any x1a ∈ [14 , 12 ]. The two extreme points of the set of
efficient and envy free assignments for η = 1/2 are
X4 =
 1/4 1/2 1/41/4 1/2 1/4
1/2 0 1/2
 , X5 =
 1/2 1/2 01/2 1/2 0
0 0 1
 .
Consider a joint distribution of types where the probability of type profile in
Table (3.5) is high. In order to satisfy the condition in Corollary 2.1, an in-
centive compatible mechanism may have to select an efficient and envy free
assignment in which the ex post expected utility of each agent is the same. We
obtain such an assignment for x1a = 2−n6−4n . For η = 1/2, the ex post expected
utility of type t1 = (1,1,0) of agent 1 in this assignment is 7/8. Hence, if the
mechanism Γ selects assignment X1 for the type profile (3.5) then the type t1 of
agent 1 has no incentive to misreport even when the probability of type profile
T−1 = ((1,η ,0),(1,0,η)) is high. Clearly, type t ￿1 = (1,η ,0) of agent 1 has no
incentive to misreport for any choice of efficient and envy free assignments for
the two type profiles.
An example of a type profile with unique ex post efficient and envy free
assignment is given in Table (3.7).
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Table 3.6 Valuations
Agent a b c
1 1 1 0
2 1 η 0
3 1 η 0
Since mechanism Γ satisfies the equal treatment of equals criterion, in order
to calculate the assignment we set x2a = x3a, x2b = x3b, and x2c = x3c. The
sufficient conditions for no envy assignment are
x1a+ x1b ≥ x2a+ x2b (3.19)
and
x2a+ηx2b ≥ x1a+ηx1b.
Inequalities (3.19) imply
η(x2b− x1b)≥ x1a− x2a ≥ x2b− x1b.
Hence,
x2b ≤ x1b, x1a ≤ x2a
and
x1b− x2b ≤ x2a− x1aη . (3.20)
Condition (3.20) binds for an ex post efficient assignment. Otherwise by in-
creasing x1b and reducing x2b we could increase the utility of agent 2 without
reducing the utility of agent 1. Hence, x1b− x2b = x2a−x1aη . If x1a > 0 there is
a Pareto improving trade between agents 1 and 2. Therefore, x1a = 0 in an ex
post efficient assignment. Hence,
x1b− x2b = x2aη , and x1a = 0. (3.21)
Since
x2a = x3a and x2b = x3b,
we obtain
x1b− x2b = x2aη , 2x2a = 1, x1b+2x2b = 1.
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Therefore,
x2b =
1
3
− 1
6η
, x1b =
1
3
+
1
3η
.
Hence, the only ex post efficient and envy free assignment for the type profile
T given in Table (3.7) is
X6 =

0 13 +
1
3η
2
3 − 13η
1/2 13 − 16η 16 + 16η
1/2 13 − 16η 16 + 16η
 .
We obtain that for any value of the grid parameter η the ex post efficient and
envy free assignment for the type profile given in Table (3.4) is unique.
3.6.2 On the impossibility to achieve fairness in the ex post
incentive efficient mechanism
For some joint distributions of types the ex post incentive efficiency and no
envy conditions are incompatible.
Proposition 11 Let deterministic mechanism Γ be anonymous, ex post efficient,
envy free, and satisfies equal treatment of equals property. There exist some
joint distributions of types such that Γ is not incentive compatible for any value
of the grid parameter η .
Proof: The proof is by example. The marginal distribution fi of types of
agent i ∈ I will be called object-symmetric if it satisfies conditions
fi((1,0,0)) = fi((0,1,0)) = fi((0,0,1)) = f 1i , (3.22)
fi((1,1,0)) = fi((0,1,1)) = fi((1,0,1)) = f 2i ,
fi((1,η ,0)) = fi((η ,1,0)) = fi((0,1,η)) =
= fi((0,η ,1)) = fi((1,0,η)) = fi((η ,0,1)) = f 3i .
We call the joint distribution F object-symmetric if marginal distribution of
types fi is object-symmetric for every i ∈ I. Consider the following joint dis-
tribution F in which marginal distributions of types of agents are different.
Marginal distributions of types of agent 1 and 3 are identical and object-symmetric.
Denote f 1 = f 11 = f
1
3 , f
2 = f 21 = f
2
3 , f
3 = f 31 = f
3
3 . The distribution f2 of types
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of agent 2 is not object-symmetric. Probability function f2 satisfies the last two
conditions in (3.22), but not the first one. In particular, let f 22 = f
2 and f 32 = f
3.
Let f2((1,0,0)) = x, f2((0,1,0)) = y, f2((0,0,1)) = z, where x,y,z ∈ [0,1],
x ￿= y, x ￿= z, y ￿= z, and x+ y+ z= 3 f 1.
Consider types t2 = (1,η ,0) and t ￿2 = (η ,1,0) of agent 2 where ||t2|| =
||t ￿2|| > 1 and t23 = t ￿23 = 0. Since Γ is incentive compatible, by Corollary 2.1
the interim expected utilities of types t2 and t ￿2 satisfy
U2(φ |(1,η ,0)) =U2(φ |(η ,1,0)).
By the choice of distribution F , for any t1, t3 ∈ Ti the probability of type profiles
T = t1×(1,η ,0)×t3 and T ￿= t1×(η ,1,0)×t3, satisfy condition p(T )= p(T ￿).
Hence,
(1,η ,0) ∑
T−2∈T−2
p−2(T−2|(1,η ,0)) φ2(T−2,(1,η ,0)) = (3.23)
= (η ,1,0) ∑
T−2∈T−2
p−2(T−2|(η ,1,0)) φ2(T−2,(η ,1,0))
where p−2(T−2|(1,η ,0)) = p−2(T−2|(η ,1,0)) for any T−2. Since mechanism
Γ is deterministic, all assignments φ2(T−2,(1,η ,0)) and φ2(T−2,(η ,1,0)) in
equality (3.23) are uniquely determined. These assignments are fixed by Γ not
only for type profiles for which the ex post efficient and envy free assignment
is unique, but also for type profiles like the type profile given in Table (3.5), for
which there exist infinitely many ex post efficient and envy free assignments.
Consider types t1 = (1,η ,0) and t ￿1 = (η ,1,0) of agent 1. Since Γ is anony-
mous and satisfies equal treatment of equals property, for any t1, t3 ∈ Ti
φ1((1,η ,0)× t1× t3) = φ2(t1× (1,η ,0)× t3)
and
φ1((η ,1,0)× t1× t3) = φ2(t1× (η ,1,0)× t3).
However, for type profiles T =(1,η ,0)×t2×t3 where t2 ∈ {(1,0,0),(0,1,0),(0,0,1)}
p−1(T−1|(1,η ,0)) ￿= p−2(T−2|(1,η ,0))
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and for type profiles T =(η ,1,0)×t2×t3 where t2 ∈ {(1,0,0),(0,1,0),(0,0,1)}
p−1(T−1|(η ,1,0)) ￿= p−2(T−2|(η ,1,0)).
Assignments for types t1 = (1,η ,0) and t ￿1 = (η ,1,0) in ex post efficient
and envy free mechanism are different for some type profiles where
t2 ∈ {(1,0,0),(0,1,0),(0,0,1)}.
For example, for the type profile T−1 given in Tables (3.7) and (3.8)
Table 3.7 Valuations
Objects
Agent a b c
1 1 η 0
2 1 0 0
3 0 0 1
Table 3.8 Valuations
Objects
Agent a b c
1 η 1 0
2 1 0 0
3 0 0 1
the ex post efficient and envy free assignment for type (1,η ,0) of agent 1
belongs to the set
{(x1a,x1b,x1c) : 1−η2−η ≤ x1a ≤
1
2
∧ x1b = 1− x1a∧ x1c = 0}
while the ex post efficient and envy free assignment for type (η ,1,0) is (0,1,0).
Therefore, the ex post utility of type t1 is t1 ·φ1(T−1,(1,η ,0)) ≤ 12 + 12η while
the ex post utility of type t ￿1 is t ￿1 ·φ1(T−1,(η ,1,0)) = 1. Hence, for any η < 1
t ￿1 ·φ1(T−1,(η ,1,0))> t1 ·φ1(T−1,(1,η ,0)).
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Taking into account equality (3.23), we conclude that there exist x,y,z ∈ [0,1]
such that x+ y+ z= 3 f 1 and
(1,η ,0) ∑
T−1∈T−1
p−1(T−1|(1,η ,0)) φ1(T−1,(1,η ,0)) ￿=
(η ,1,0) ∑
T−1∈T−1
p−1(T−1|(η ,1,0)) φ1(T−1,(η ,1,0)).
Therefore,
U1(φ |(1,η ,0)) ￿=U1(φ |(η ,1,0)),
which violates the necessary condition for the incentive compatibility of Γ es-
tablished by Corollary 2.1. Therefore, for any value of parameter η , mechanism
Γ is not incentive compatible for the joint distribution F. ￿
The example suggests that the mechanism Γ may be ex post incentive effi-
cient and envy free when the joint distribution F is both agent-symmetric and
object-symmetric.
3.7 Conclusion
Our motivation for this project was to understand the ability of cardinal mecha-
nism without monetary transfers to provide efficient and envy-free assignments
of heterogeneous objects to agents with private valuations and common prior
over the preference profiles. We use a simple assignment mechanism that re-
stricts the message space by allowing agents to report a limited number of pref-
erence intensities and indifferences between alternatives. The mechanism as-
signs a probability distribution over the set of feasible allocations for each pref-
erence profile. We provided necessary conditions for incentive compatibility
of these mechanisms for any finite number of agents and we characterized the
set of incentive compatible assignment rules for the case of three agents. We
provided some necessary conditions for regularity of the optimization problem
related to the interim efficient mechanisms. We showed that the ex post envy-
freeness property may be incompatible with ex post incentive efficiency of the
mechanism. We provided an example of a common belief about the distribution
of type profiles where the set of ex post incentive efficient and ex post envy free
allocations is empty.
The existence of a common prior that describes the joint distribution of
agents’ types and induces interim beliefs is assumed in much of the applied
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mechanism design. This assumption eliminates the possibility that agents may
assign zero probability to the true state of the world. The reliance of the
Bayesian mechanism design on the common prior assumption has been criti-
cized as unrealistic in the literature since the famous paper by Wilson (1995).
The critique is focused on environments where the mechanism designer has no
information about the beliefs of agents, while for the school allocation problem
this is not quite relevant.
Nevertheless, the common prior assumption is not without loss of generality
for the designer’s problem. Recent literature on mechanism design suggests dif-
ferent methods for overcoming the dependence of the social choice implemen-
tation on the common prior assumption. One method is to replace the Bayesian
incentive compatibility with a stronger solution concept that is not sensitive
to agents’ beliefs. For example, the designer may choose a dominant strategy
mechanism which is optimal with respect to his subjective beliefs. Another
method is to relax the common prior assumption by allowing for the possibil-
ity that agent’s beliefs do not uniquely determine their preferences. Agent’s
private information (type) may be informative about or correlated with other
agents’ types in two senses. One is that agent’s preferences may be correlated
with agent’s own belief, the other is that the prior that describes the joint distri-
bution of agents’ types may show correlation among different types. A further
study is required to answer the question of which relaxing assumption about the
beliefs should be made in the context of the school allocation problem.
It has been well understood since the work by Moore and Repullo (1988)
that the set of implementable social choice rules can be dramatically expanded
by the use of extensive game forms. One direction for further research can be
analysis of decentralized assignment mechanisms that induce extensive game
forms and might solve the designer’s problem of achieving an efficient and fair
allocation.
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Chapter 4
Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 1
An offer of x does not affect the belief of player i about the unknown type t j
and player’s expected war payoff π(ti) . By Lemma (1), function π(ti) is strictly
increasing in ti on [0,1]. Hence, it has an inverse function, which we denote by
φ(.). The inverse function satisfies π(φ(y)) = y for any y ∈ [1− p, p(1− α2 )].
The value of φ(y) is the type of player who has an expected war payoff y.
As a monotone real-valued function, π(ti) is differentiable almost everywhere.
Similarly, the inverse function φ(.) is also differentiable almost everywhere.
The inverse functions is monotone and increasing in [1− p, p(1− α2 )], so we
keep the direction of inequality as
x≥ π(ti)⇔ φ(x)≥ ti.
Therefore,
P(x≥ π(ti)) = P(φ(x)≥ ti) = φ(x).
First, we calculate the probability that an offer of x ∈ [0,1] is accepted by
player of type t. Inequality
x≥ π(t)
is equivalent to
(1− p− x)+(−1− α
2
+2p+
α p
2
)t+(
α
2
−α p)t3 ≤ 0.
Then we solve
(2−2p−2x)+(−2−α+4p+α p)t+α(1−2p)t3 ≤ 0. (4.1)
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Recall that 1−2p< 0. Dividing both sides by α(1−2p) we obtain
t3+
−2−α+4p+α p
α(1−2p) t+
(2−2p−2x)
α(1−2p) ≥ 0. (4.2)
Equation
t3+
−2−α+4p+α p
α(1−2p) t+
(2−2p−2x)
α(1−2p) = 0 (4.3)
has three distinct real roots. Hence, although all roots are real, we require
complex numbers to express them in radicals. That is why we express the root
which belongs to the interval [0,1] in terms of the cos and arccos functions. For
simplicity of notation we denote
r =
−2−α+4p+α p
α(1−2p) and q=
(2−2p−2x)
α(1−2p) . (4.4)
Then
t = 2
￿
− r
3
cos(
1
3
arccos(
3q
2r
￿
−3
r
)− 2π
3
) =
=−2
￿
− r
3
sin(
π
6
− 1
3
arccos(
3q
2r
￿
−3
r
)) (4.5)
is a real root in the interval [0,1] because r < 0 for any p and α satisfying
condition (2.2). The left hand side of (4.1) is decreasing function, hence we
change the direction of inequality and we obtain
P(x≥ π(t)) = P(t <−2
￿
− r
3
sin(
π
6
− 1
3
arccos(
3q
2r
￿
−3
r
))) = (4.6)
=−2
￿
− r
3
sin(
π
6
− 1
3
arccos(
3q
2r
￿
−3
r
)).
Next, we calculate the probability that a peaceful split (12 ,
1
2) is accepted.
The joint cumulative distribution function of random variables π(t1) and π(t2)
is
P(1/2≥ π(t1)∧1/2≥ π(t2))=P(1/2≥ π(t1))P(1/2≥ π(t2))=P2(1/2≥ π(t))
because π(t1) and π(t2) are independent and identically distributed. Hence
P(1/2,1/2) = P2(1/2≥ π(t)) = φ2(1/2).
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Substituting x= 1/2 in (4.4) we obtain q= 1α . From (4.6) we obtain
P(1/2≥ π(t)) = 2
￿
− r
3
cos(
1
3
arccos(
3q
2r
￿
−3
r
)− 2π
3
)
where
r =
−2−α+4p+α p
α(1−2p) and q=
1
α
. (4.7)
Hence,
P(1/2,1/2) =−4
3
r sin2 (
π
6
− 1
3
arccos(
3
√
3q
￿
−1r
2r
))
where r and q are given by (4.7). ￿
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Proof of Proposition 7
The proof is by construction. We calculate parameters of the optimal me-
diation programme and we show that both types have no incentive to deviate
from recommendations of the mediator.
1. We note that sl appears only in left-hand side of the low type IC constraint
(2.79) and this left-hand side is increasing in sl because πl(ti) ≤ 12 by
lemma (2). Hence, sl = 1 in the solution of the problem (2.76).
2. We note that by lemma (2) the coefficient of sh in the left-hand side of
the high type IR constraint (2.78) is positive. Moreover, the coefficient
1
2 − (1− p)(12 − 3αti8 ) of sh in the right-hand side of the low type interim
IC constraint is also positive. Hence, the low type interim IC constraint
must be binding for some ti ≤ 1/2 in the solution of relaxed problem,
otherwise we could increase sh thus increasing the value of the objective
function, without violating the high type IR constraint (2.78).
3. We note that the high type IR constraint must be binding for some ti≥ 1/2
in the solution of relaxed problem, otherwise we could decrease b and
make the low type IC constraint slack.
4. We would like to show that sh > sm in the solution of relaxed problem,
which implies that the low type IC constraint binds for ti = 1/2. Further,
we show that the IR constraint for the high type binds for ti = 1.
In the light of step one, the constraint (2.61) which binds for some ti = t∗i
becomes
1
2
−πl(t∗i )+ smπl(t∗i )−2b+ sm
1
2
+ sm
￿
1
2
− (1− p)(1
2
− 3αt
∗
i
8
)
￿
=
= sh
￿
1
2
− (1− p)(1
2
− 3αt
∗
i
8
)
￿
.
As 12 − (1− p)(12 − 3αti8 )> 0 for any ti, parameter
sh = sm+
1
2 −πl(t∗i )+ smπl(t∗i )+ sm 12 −2b
1
2 − (1− p)(12 −
3αt∗i
8 )
(4.8)
is well defined. We would like to show that the second term in the right-
hand side of (4.8) is positive. Clearly, 12 − (1− p)(12 − 3αt
∗
i
8 ) > 0. It
93
remains to show that inequality
1
2
−πl(t∗i )+ smπl(t∗i )+ sm
1
2
−2b> 0 (4.9)
holds.
The IR constraint (2.60) binds for some ti = t∗∗i , therefore
b= smp
￿
1
2
− αt
∗∗
i
8
￿
− sh
￿
1
2
−πh(t∗∗i )
￿
.
We note that 12 − πh(t∗∗i ) > 0 by lemma (2). Hence, b ≤ smp12 for any
feasible sh ≥ 0.
Therefore, the left-hand side of (4.9) satisfies
1
2
−πl(t∗i )+ smπl(t∗i )+ sm
1
2
−2b> 1
2
+(sm−1)πl(t∗i )+ sm
1
2
− smp.
(4.10)
We note that inequality sm−1≤ 0 holds for the probability sm. Hence, the
right-hand side of (4.10) is minimal when the value of πl(t∗i ) is maximal,
that is, for ti = 1/2. Hence,
1
2
+(sm−1)πl(t∗i )+ sm
1
2
− smp≥ 12 +(sm−1)
p
2
(1− α
8
)+ sm(
1
2
− p) =
=
1
2
− p
2
+
α p
16
+sm(
p
2
(1−α
8
)+
1
2
− p)= 1
2
− p
2
+
α p
16
+sm(
1
2
− p
2
−α p
16
)=
= g(sm).
For parameter values for which 12 − p2 − α p16 > 0 the value of g(sm) is
minimal for sm = 0. Then g(0) = 12 − p2 + α p16 > 0 for any parameters
values. For parameter values for which 12− p2 − α p16 < 0 the value of g(sm)
is minimal for sm = 1. Then the minimal value of g(sm) is g(1) = 1− p>
0. Hence, for any parameters values g(sm) > 0 and inequality (4.9) is
satisfied.
Therefore, in the light of equation (4.8) we conclude that sh > sm in the
solution of relaxed problem. In the light of step 1 we rewrite the interim
IC constraint for the low type (2.61) as
1
2
+ sm− sm(1− p)12 ≥
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≥ 2b+(1− sm)πl(ti)+ sh12 − sh(1− p)
1
2
+(sh− sm)(1− p)3αti8 .
We notice that the right hand side of this inequality is maximal for ti =
1/2 because 1− sm ≥ 0, sh− sm > 0, and by lemma (2) πl(ti) is maximal
for ti = 1/2. Therefore, the interim IC constraint for the low type binds
for ti = 1/2.
It is easy to check that for sh > sm and ti ∈ [1/2,1] the value of expression
smpαti8 − shπh(ti) in the left hand side of IR constraint (2.78) is minimal
for ti = 1. Hence, the IR constraint for the high type binds for ti = 1.
Therefore, the IR constraint
sh
￿
1
2
−πh(1)
￿
+b− smp
￿
1
2
− α
8
￿
≥ 0
and the IC constraint
1
2
−πl(1/2)+ sm− sm(1− p)
￿
1
2
− 3α
16
￿
≥
≥ 2b− smπl(1/2)+ sh
￿
1
2
− (1− p)
￿
1
2
− 3α
16
￿￿
bind.
5. We rewrite the constraints of the relaxed problem by substituting
b= smp(
1
2
− α
8
)− sh
￿
1
2
− p(1
2
− 3α
8
)
￿
in the IC constraint for ti = 1/2
1
2
− 1
2
p(1− α
8
)+ sm− sm(1− p)(12 −
3α
16
) =
= 2b− sm12 p(1−
α
8
)+ sh(
1
2
− (1− p)(1
2
− 3α
16
))
and we obtain
sm =−8−8p+α p8+3α − sh
16−3α−24p+15α p
8+3α
(4.11)
In the light of step 1 we simplify the objective function (2.58) and maxi-
mize
maxsh,sm {2sm+ sh} . (4.12)
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Substituting sm by the RHS of (4.11) we maximize expression
W = const+ sh
48p−24+9α−30α p
8+3α
.
We note that coefficient of sh is positive for any values of parameters α
and p that satisfy condition (2.2). Hence, the maximization ofW requires
maximization of sh. The value of sh is bounded by probability constraints
(2.77). The ex ante probability of peace W in the Bayesian equilibrium
of the induced game is maximal for sh = 1. It is a feasible value for sh for
some range of parameters α and p.
We distinguish two cases for these parameter values. Clearly, (2.2) im-
plies α ∈ (0,1/2). For 16(19−
√
265)< α ≤ 1/2 or
0< α ≤ 1
6
(19−√265) ∧ 24−3α
32−16α < p≤ 1,
where 16(19−
√
265)≈ 0.45353, the value of 1 is feasible for sh. For this
range of parameters α and p we compute sm from equation (4.11) and we
obtain
0< sm =
32p−24+3α−16α p
8+3α
< 1. (4.13)
For 0 < α ≤ 16(19−
√
265) ∧ 1/2 < p < 24−3α32−16α the maximal feasible
value of sh satisfying all constraints of the relaxed problem is the value
corresponding to sm = 0. This is a feasible value of sm. However, the
corresponding value of sh and, hence, the value of W is lower for this
range of parameter values.
We show in subsequence that for parameter values satisfying condition (4.13)
the ex ante probability of peace in the Bayesian equilibrium of the induced
game is lower than the ex ante probability of peace in the non-mediated game.
Let the solution of the initial problem (2.51) be qh = 1,
qm+ pm =
32p−24+3α−16α p
8+3α
and ql +2pl = 1. In this case diads (h,h) and (l, l) do not fight in the Bayesian
equilibrium of the induced game. We can choose the value of x in such a way
that this solution does not violate the high-type IC constraint and the low type
IR constraint. However, the ex ante probability of peace in the best separating
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equilibrium of the mediation game is for these values of parameters p and α
the same as the ex ante probability of peace in the best separating equilibrium
of the mediation game induced by mediation programme (2.50).
￿
Chapter 5
Appendix B
Proof of Proposition 10
By a well known result of Hardy, Littlewood and Polya (1952) published in
[7], for any agent i, the rank of the optimal weight’s product λi(ti) fi(ti) in the
increasing order of weights’ products {λi(ti) fi(ti)}ti∈Ti is the same as the rank
of the interim expected utility Ui(φ , ti) in the increasing order of the interim
expected utilities {Ui(φ , ti)}ti∈Ti . Since Γ is Bayesian incentive compatible,
by Corollary 1.1 for any agent i and any three types t ￿￿i ￿i ti ￿i t ￿i , the interim
expected utility Ui(φ , ti) satisfies Ui(φ |t ￿￿i )≤Ui(φ |ti)≤Ui(φ |t ￿i), which estab-
lishes the result.
￿

